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FREEDOM, FINALITY, AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: SEEKING EXPANDED JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER
STATE LAW AFTER HALL STREET
Brian T. Burns*
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc. in March 2008, the Court held that under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), parties to an arbitration agreement may not
contractually expand the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration
award beyond the grounds enumerated in the FAA. In dicta, however, the
Court expressly left open the possibility that parties nonetheless may obtain
expanded review by relying on state arbitration law, rather than the FAA.
This Note examines the availability of contractually expanded review under
state law and addresses the question of whether, in light of Hall Street's
holding and despite its dicta, the FAA preempts state laws that otherwise
would permit expanded review of arbitration awards. This Note looks at
the history and development of the FAA and examines its preemptive effect
on state laws. It then analyzes the arguments for and against the
proposition that the FAA preempts state laws that permit expanded review.
Finally, this Note argues that the FAA should preempt state laws that
permit expanded review, unless the parties have expressly agreed that state
arbitration law will apply to the exclusion of the FAA.
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration,' in large part, is about freedom.2 It is about the freedom to
opt out of the public dispute resolution system and into a privately ordered
one designed to be faster, more efficient, and more accommodating than its
public counterpart. 3 For adverse parties in a dispute, it is about the freedom
to decide that a privately conducted arbitration proceeding is a superior
alternative to public court adjudication. 4 And for those same parties, it is
1. Arbitration can be defined as a "method of dispute resolution involving one or more
neutral third parties who are [usually] agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision
is binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
2. See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2009). Through arbitration, parties can decide, for example,
what claims to arbitrate, what arbitrators will decide their dispute, what law will govern their
underlying rights in the dispute, and what procedures will govern the arbitration itself. See
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008).
3. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 1104-05.
4. See id.
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about the freedom to shape the contours of their chosen alternative. 5 In
short, arbitration is largely about the freedom to choose arbitration.
However, the broad freedom arbitration affords is not without limits. It is
subject to judicial and legislative limitations on the structure of the arbitral
process designed to preserve arbitration's fundamental values of efficiency,
finality, and autonomy.6 Many of these limitations take the form of judicial
review provisions. Judicial review provisions enumerate the grounds upon
which a court may vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator's award. 7
Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act 8 (FAA) are examples of
judicial review provisions.9 The grounds for judicial review of arbitration
awards are narrow. 10 However, in recent years, parties wanting to expand
these grounds have included provisions in their arbitration agreements that
provide, for example, that a court shall vacate an arbitrator's award if it is
legally erroneous. 11  The validity of these provisions created a sharp
conflict in the federal courts. 12
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue with its
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.1 3 In Hall Street,
the Court decided that parties may not, by contract, expand the grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards beyond those grounds listed in §§ 10
and 11 of the FAA. 14  To the parties in Hall Street, this meant that the
provision in their agreement that required vacatur of any award "where the
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1129-30 (discussing arbitration's core values).
7. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1402 (describing the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA)
judicial review provisions).
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). The FAA applies, at least in part, to all arbitration
agreements involving interstate commerce. See id. §§ 1-2.
9. See id. §§ 10-11.
10. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
11. See Eric Chafetz, The Propriety of Expanded Judicial Review Under the FAA:
Achieving a Balance Between Enforcing Parties' Agreements According to Their Terms and
Maintaining Arbitral Efficiency, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 2 (2006) (noting the
"recent trend" of parties attempting to expand the grounds for judicial review). This Note
assumes that any contractually expanded review provision contains a standard of review that
is generally familiar to courts. This will avoid the problem of expanded review provisions
that provide for strange or unfamiliar standards of review. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that
expanded review provisions should not be honored when the parties, for example, ask the
court to "review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl"),
overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc). As an alternative to expanded judicial review provisions, parties may also
provide for appellate arbitration, whose validity is not subject to the same controversy as
expanded judicial review provisions. See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000; Hans Smit, Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 513, 522 (2008)
(acknowledging that "nothing prevents the parties from creating a system of appellate review
within the arbitration structure").
12. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403 & n.5 (noting and describing the circuit split over the
validity of expanded review clauses). See generally Chafetz, supra note 11, at 17-36
(discussing the split of authority).
13. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
14. Id. at 1400-01.
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arbitrator's conclusions of law [were] erroneous" 15 no longer stated a valid
ground for judicial review under the FAA. 16 The Court, however, was
careful to limit its holding to the FAA. In part IV of its opinion, the Court
stated, "[W]e do not purport to say that [§§ 10 and 11] exclude more
searching review based on authority outside the [FAA] as well."' 17 This
statement suggests that the Court did not intend categorically to preclude
parties from obtaining expanded judicial review in all forums and under all
circumstances. However, the Court did not address the possibility that FAA
§ § 10 and 11 may preempt outside authority that otherwise would permit
parties to expand the scope of judicial review by contract.
This Note examines that possibility. Specifically, this Note examines
whether FAA § 10, as interpreted in Hall Street, preempts state laws 18 that
permit parties to expand the grounds for judicial review of arbitration
awards by contract. 19 Part I of this Note provides background information
about the FAA and about the FAA's preemptive effect on state laws. In
that context, it discusses the history and policies of the FAA and examines
the development of the FAA's applicability in both federal and state court.
Then it addresses the preemptive effect of the FAA by discussing federal
preemption generally and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on FAA
preemption specifically. Finally, Part I discusses the Hall Street decision
and provides an overview of state laws that purport to permit contractually
expanded review. Part I examines the arguments for and against the
proposition that FAA § 10, as interpreted in Hall Street, preempts state laws
that permit expanded review. In that context, it examines § 10's
applicability, § 10's role in the FAA, and the effect of a contrary state law
on the policies of the FAA. It also examines the effect that a choice of
arbitration law clause has on the analysis. Part III argues that § 10 should
preempt state laws that permit contractually expanded review, unless the
parties have expressly agreed that state arbitration law will apply to the
exclusion of the FAA. It contends that this result is consistent with both
Hall Street and with the policies underlying the FAA.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1406 (identifying "state statutory or common law" as examples of non-FAA
alternatives for enforcement).
18. Such laws include those of California and New Jersey. See infra Part I.F.
19. This Note focuses primarily on the preemptive effect of § 10's vacatur provisions; it
does not directly examine the preemptive effect of § 11, although the analysis should be the
same as for § 10. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05 (analyzing the effect of §§ 10 and 11 in
the same way).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAA, HALL STREET, AND STATE VACATUR LAW
A. The FAA's History
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925. 2 0 The FAA was largely a response
to the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce executory agreements to
arbitrate. 21 Prior to the enactment of the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate
was revocable until an award was rendered. 22 The rationale for this
approach was the belief that specific enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate would "oust[]" the courts "from their jurisdiction. ' 23 The rule was
well established in English common law, and U.S. courts, in turn, adopted it
and refused to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate.24 U.S. courts
criticized the common-law rule, but they refused to overturn it without
legislative action.25 Congress provided the necessary legislative action
when it enacted the FAA.2 6 Modeled after a New York statute passed in
1920,27 the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." 28  This provision is the core of the FAA.29  It, in effect,
replaced the common-law prohibition on specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements 30 and effectuated Congress's intent to place arbitration
20. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)). The United States Arbitration Act is now called the Federal
Arbitration Act. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting the different names).
21. See, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 13-14; H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); Stephen
K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 524 (2009).
22. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); James E. Berger &
Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 745, 747 (2009) (discussing the revocability doctrine).
23. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2.
24. Id. at 2. Despite their reluctance to specifically enforce arbitration agreements,
courts did not wholly deprive arbitration agreements of validity. See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2
(1924). For example, a party could seek and receive monetary damages if another party
breached an executory arbitration agreement. Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2; see Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (acknowledging criticisms of the common-law rule but nonetheless
applying it), affd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924).
26. The FAA was drafted by the American Bar Association (ABA), H.R. REP. No. 68-
96, at 1, and was enacted by Congress with minimal revisions. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
107 (1992) ("[T]he role of Congress in enacting the [FAA] was the limited one of making a
few modest changes in what the A.B.A. presented to it and, finally, of putting its stamp of
approval on the bar association's product.").
27. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (noting that the FAA follows the New York statute).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
29. 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 9.3, at 9:30 (1995 & Supp. 1999) ("The
elimination of revocability of executory arbitration agreements was (and is) the central
feature differentiating modem arbitration statutes from earlier arbitration statutes .... ").
30. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (discussing the common-law rule and stating that
"[t]he bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced").
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agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they]
belong[]. ' '31
In enacting the FAA, Congress relied on its power to regulate interstate
commerce. 32 It also relied on its power to control procedure in the federal
courts. 3 3 Congress described the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a
matter of procedure for the court where an action to enforce an arbitration
agreement was brought.34 Congress derived this notion largely from the
New York Court of Appeals, which, in interpreting the New York statute
after which the FAA was patterned, characterized arbitration "as a form of
procedure." 35 As a result of this characterization, a New York federal court
refused to apply the New York state arbitration law and instead applied
common-law rules hostile to arbitration.36 Thus, Congress opined, if the
federal courts were to enforce agreements to arbitrate, they needed to have
federal procedures in place that would allow them to do SO. 3 7 The FAA,
Congress said, provided those procedures and codified them into law.38
This historical context suggests that the enacting Congress intended the
FAA to apply only in federal courts. 39 The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
31. Id. at 1.
32. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
33. Southland, 465 U.S. at 28 & n.14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
legislative history of the FAA relies more heavily on Congress's "power over the jurisdiction
of the federal courts" than on its Commerce Clause power (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 & n.13 (1967))); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (stating
that the FAA is a "matter ... properly the subject of Federal action" because it provides for
federal court procedures).
34. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
35. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 270 (1921) (characterizing the
enforcement of arbitration agreements as "part of the law of remedies" and noting that "[t]he
rule to be applied is the rule of the forum").
36. See Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(characterizing the New York law as a "new method of procedure," and refusing to stay
proceedings pending arbitration based on the New York law because "it is not within the
power of the state to regulate the procedure and practice of a federal court"), affd, 5 F.2d
218 (2d Cir. 1924).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
38. See id. at 2 ("The bill ... provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement.").
39. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One
rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's. That history establishes
conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only
in federal courts .... "); see Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong.
37 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (brief of Julius H. Cohen, American Bar Association)
("A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements does relate
solely to procedure of the Federal courts. It is no infringement upon the right of each State
to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws."); id. at 40 ("There is
no disposition therefore by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into
an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement."); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 ("Whether
an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be
determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive
law to be determined by the law of the forum in which the contract is made."); see also
MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 115 (noting that there was no opposition to the FAA and arguing
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has rejected that conclusion.40 Instead, the Court has held that the FAA
creates substantive rights that are enforceable in both federal and state
court.41 This line of reasoning, discussed in detail in Part I.C.2, will be
important in determining the scope of FAA preemption and the FAA's
effect on state laws that permit parties to expand judicial review of
arbitration awards by contract.
Unlike other federal statutes, the FAA does not create an independent
basis for federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction.42 This means that
parties cannot properly proceed in federal court simply by asserting that the
FAA applies to their arbitration agreement in the sense that the agreement
involves interstate commerce.43 For parties to proceed in federal court, they
must assert a separate basis for subject matter jurisdiction outside the
FAA,44 such as diversity of citizenship 45 or the presence of a question of
federal law apart from the FAA, in the underlying dispute. 46 The result of
the FAA's independent jurisdictional requirement is that state courts are
frequently required to apply the FAA.47 State courts, however, may not
necessarily be required to apply all individual provisions of the FAA.48
This unsettled issue forms much of the controversy surrounding the validity
of state laws that permit parties to expand the grounds for judicial review of
arbitration awards. The next section provides a foundation for
understanding that controversy by providing an overview of the relevant
individual FAA provisions and the policies underlying the statute as a
whole.
that the lack of opposition suggests that Congress understood the FAA to be applicable only
in federal courts).
40. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 ("[W]e cannot believe Congress intended to limit the
Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal-court jurisdiction."). Southland Corp. v.
Keating's use of the legislative history of the FAA has been severely criticized. See infra
note 135 and accompanying text.
41. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
42. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (noting that the
FAA is "'something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction' (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983))); Southland,
465 U.S. at 15 n.9; see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (permitting a court to compel arbitration pursuant
to an agreement if the court, "save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title
28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties").
43. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1402 (stating that the FAA requires an "independent
jurisdictional basis" (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32)).
44. Id.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
46. See id. § 1331.
47. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32 ("[E]nforcement of the Act is left in large
part to the state courts .... "); 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:88 (noting
that state courts deal with FAA cases).
48. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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B. Individual FAA Sections and Underlying Policies
For the purposes of this Note, the following sections of the FAA are most
relevant: §§ 2, 3, 4, 9, and 10. Each of these sections is discussed below.
Section 2. Section 2 of the FAA is the core provision of the Act.4 9 It
provides that a written agreement to arbitrate will be "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 50 Section 2 applies to any "contract evidencing
a transaction involving [interstate] commerce." 51 The provision applies
both to present agreements to arbitrate future disputes and to present
agreements to arbitrate current disputes that have already arisen.52
The "saving" clause of § 253 serves to ensure that arbitration agreements
are "placed upon the same footing as other contracts." 54 The clause affords
parties the ability to avoid performance of an arbitration agreement if their
defense to the validity of the arbitration agreement is one that would allow
them to avoid performance of any other contract. 55 It also preserves a role
for state law in enforcing (or refusing to enforce) arbitration agreements. 56
Because contract law is generally a matter of state law, rather than
federal, 57 the clause contemplates that state contract defenses will serve as a
limit on the broad enforceability § 2 affords to arbitration agreements. 58
Furthermore, discerning the contours of state law's role in governing
arbitration agreements that are subject to the FAA will be important in
analyzing the preemptive effect of the FAA on those state laws.
Section 3. Section 3 provides a procedure for enforcing a parties'
arbitration agreement. If a party enters into a contract containing a written
arbitration agreement and, instead of arbitrating a dispute that arises from
the contract, brings an action in federal court to resolve the dispute, the
other party to the agreement can ask the court to stay the judicial
proceeding until arbitration occurs "in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. ' 59 The court is obligated to grant the stay as long as the court
finds that the disputed issue is "referable to arbitration. ' 60 In determining
49. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:30.
50. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
51. Id.; see id. § 1.
52. Id. § 2.
53. The "saving" clause refers to the following language: "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
55. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). Such
defenses include fraud, duress, and unconscionability. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
56. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281 (noting that "§ 2 gives States a method for protecting"
parties against "an unwanted arbitration provision").
57. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J.
393, 398 (2004).
58. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 281.
59. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
60. Id.
1820 [Vol. 78
2010] FREEDOM, FINALITY, AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
whether an issue is referable to arbitration, the court should consider only
whether the parties, in fact, entered into the arbitration agreement. 61
Section 4. If a party to an arbitration agreement fails, neglects, or refuses
to arbitrate according to the arbitration agreement, § 4 permits the aggrieved
party to make a motion in "any United States district court" for a court
order compelling the other party to arbitrate according to the agreement. 62
The court is required to grant the motion and compel arbitration as long as
it finds that the arbitration agreement, in fact, was made and that the
offending party is failing to comply with the agreement. 63
Section 9. Section 9 permits a court to enter a judgment upon an
arbitrator's award. 64 Through this process, the award obtains the force of a
court judgment, with which the parties must comply. 65 Section 9 permits a
court to enter a judgment upon an award only if the parties have agreed to
allow the court to do so. 66 Thus, the parties' agreement must contain some
language indicating that they intended the arbitrator's award to be given the
force of law. 67  Section 9 permits the parties to determine, in their
agreement, which court shall enter judgment upon the award and to apply to
that court for an order confirming the award. 68 It then provides that the
court chosen by the parties "must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this
title." 69 If the parties fail to specify a court, the parties may apply for an
order confirming the award in the U.S. district court in the district where the
award was rendered. 70
Section 10. Section 10 provides the grounds upon which a court may
vacate an arbitration award. 71 The party seeking to vacate the award must
make a timely application to the court and notify its adversary of its intent
61. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). In
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the Court drew its conclusion on the
meaning of § 3 from the language of § 4, see id. at 403-04, which provides that a court shall
grant an order compelling arbitration if the court finds that "the making of the agreement for
arbitration... is not in issue." 9 U.S.C. § 4.
62. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 9.
65. See D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
confirmation gives an arbitration award "force and effect").
66. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (stating that confirmation is available only "[i]f the parties in their
agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award").
67. See Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Eng'g Co., 59 F.2d 1038, 1039 (D.C. Cir.
1932) ("[A] plaintiff must bring himself clearly within his statute before he is entitled to its
remedy."). Courts have found that language in an arbitration agreement stating that the
award be final is enough to allow a court to enter judgment upon the award. See Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 276 (1932) (finding "final and binding" sufficient);
Daihatsu Motor Co. v. Terrain Vehicles, Inc., 13 F.3d 196, 196 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
"finally settled" sufficient).
68. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. § 10(a).
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to do SO. 7 2 Section 10 provides four grounds upon which "the United States
court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award. '73 The four grounds are as follows:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made. 74
These grounds for vacatur address "egregious departures" from the agreed-
upon role of the arbitrators. 75  They address serious procedural
irregularities 76 and erect high burdens for parties seeking to vacate an
award.77 In addition, courts generally apply a presumption against vacating
an award and in favor of confirming it.78
In addition to the grounds stated in § 10, courts have also created a
variety of nonstatutory grounds for reviewing arbitration awards. 79 These
are grounds that, despite their ostensible absence from the statutory text,
72. See id. § 12 ("Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be
served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or
delivered.").
73. Id. § 10(a).
74. Id. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
75. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008); see also
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 (3d Cir.
1975) (noting that a court's review of an arbitration award is "narrow in the extreme").
76. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 145 n.l 19 (2002) ("Section 10 of the FAA
prescribes limited grounds for judicial review focused on preservation of basic procedural
fairness ...").
77. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1108 (discussing the strict requirements for each of the
statutory grounds for review); see Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987)
("[T]he showing required to avoid summary confirmation is high." (citing Nat'l Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Mgmt. Co., 597 F.2d 819, 825 (2d Cir. 1979))); Huber, supra note
21, at 521-23 (describing the grounds for vacatur and the high standards required to meet
them).
78. See Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir.
2004) ("When reviewing an arbitral award, courts accord 'an extraordinary level of
deference' to the underlying award itself. ... (quoting Keebler Co. v. Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 471, 80 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1996))); Upshur Coals
Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1991) ("An arbitrator's
award is entitled to a special degree of deference on judicial review." (citing United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987))); see also Ottley, 819 F.2d
at 376 (noting the court's obligation to confirm an award and the high standard required to
avoid confirmation); Schmitz, supra note 76, at 151.
79. See generally Reuben, supra note 2, at 1110-16 (discussing nonstatutory grounds for
review).
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courts have invoked to vacate arbitration awards the courts felt were
improper. 80 The most frequently alleged nonstatutory ground for vacatur is
"manifest disregard of the law."'" Courts have also vacated awards on the
grounds that the award was against public policy, 82 that the award was
arbitrary and capricious, 83 or that the award was irrational. 84 Vacatur on
any of these grounds is rare.85 For the purposes of this Note, however, most
of the statutory and nonstatutory grounds are not at issue.86 This Note
addresses the question of whether parties can provide for, and receive
enforcement of, a standard of review that a court otherwise would not apply
absent the provision in the parties' agreement. An example of this is a
provision that provides for vacatur if the arbitrator makes an error of law.
For the purposes of this Note then, it is enough to acknowledge that the
FAA does not recognize legal or factual error as a valid basis for vacating
an award. 87 The limited review available under the FAA implicates the
underlying policies of the FAA, which, to a very great extent, will influence
the preemptive effect of its provisions.88 These policies are discussed next.
80. See Huber, supra note 21, at 523.
81. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding
Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 167, 189 (2008); see
Huber, supra note 21, at 523 (noting that recognition of the "Manifest Disregard" standard is
widespread).
82. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1113; see Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus &
Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 n.1 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he public policy exception provides an
additional basis for reversing an arbitration award where the terms of the arbitration contract,
either expressly or as interpreted by the arbitrators, violate public policy or where the award
requires parties undertake some action in violation of public policy."); Northrop Corp. v.
Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928, 934 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating award as
contrary to public policy), rev'd in part sub nom. Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A.,
811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987).
83. See Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (refusing to enforce
an arbitration award because it was arbitrary and capricious); see also Brown v. Rauscher
Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496, 500 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that the arbitrary and
capricious standard is a ground for vacatur), af)fd, 994 F.2d 775 (11 th Cir. 1993).
84. See Rivera v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259, 262 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that
irrationality is a ground for vacating an award and vacating the award on that ground).
85. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1110; see LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 81, at 189
(describing an empirical study that showed that "manifest disregard" resulted in vacatur in
only 7.1% of the cases in which it was alleged).
86. However, an understanding of them is necessary to provide the context in which
courts examine an agreement that attempts to contractually expand the grounds for review.
See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (analyzing the
validity of an expanded review clause in context with the existing standards of review).
87. See id. ("[I]t would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds
[for review under the FAA] to the point of evidentiary and legal review generally."); Solvay
Pharm., Inc. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that neither
legal nor factual error is grounds for reversing an arbitrator's decision); Flexible Mfg. Sys.
Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that neither factual
nor legal errors are grounds for vacatur under the FAA); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750
F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).
88. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989).
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Section 2 reflects Congress's ultimate purpose in enacting the FAA: to
ensure the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 89 Though this is a
single policy, the FAA's development has revealed that this policy has
component parts. 90  Those parts can be characterized as follows: first,
courts acknowledge parties' freedom to choose arbitration by specifically
enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate; 91 second, courts preserve the
value of the arbitration process by ensuring its finality;92 third, courts
recognize arbitration's potential to provide for the efficient resolution of
disputes; 93 and fourth, courts construe arbitration agreements in a way that
is "pro-arbitration. '94  Even as part of an overarching, single policy,
however, these subpolicies have the potential to collide. 95 When they do-
89. Id. at 478 (recognizing "Congress' principal purpose of ensuring that private
arbitration agreements are enforced"); S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting that "[t]he
purpose of the [FAA] is clearly set forth in section 2"); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)
("The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration .... ");
MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 150 (stating the policy as follows: "to permit people by contract
to choose the alleged efficiencies of binding arbitration agreements").
90. See MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 149-50 (noting that the policy was "artificially split
into conflicting policies").
91. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to
it .... "); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (noting that "[b]y
compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects the
contractual rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act"); H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 1 ("[T]he effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his
agreement."); see also Reuben, supra note 2, at 1130 (noting that party autonomy is a
"process virtue" of arbitration).
92. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (acknowledging "arbitration's essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway" when interpreting the FAA); Joint Hearings, supra note 39,
at 34 (describing the "limited" grounds for vacatur in § 10 and concluding that if an award
meets a condition of § 10, "then and then only the award may be vacated"); H.R. REP. No.
68-96, at 2 (suggesting that the FAA intended to ensure the finality of arbitration awards by
stating that the award is only "subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption
and similar undue influence, or for palpable error in form"); Schmitz, supra note 76, at 149-
51 (describing the approach the FAA's drafter's took to finality and concluding that
"[f]inality as defined by the judicial review limitations of the FAA sought to insulate
arbitration from courts' 'Monday morning quarterbacking' and protect the allocation of
power in the Act between arbitrators and courts").
93. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221 (noting that one policy underlying the FAA is the
"encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution"); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2
(noting that the FAA was intended to "reduc[e] technicality, delay, and expense to a
minimum"); Reuben, supra note 2, at 1130 (acknowledging "FAA arbitration's core
characteristics and values of finality and efficiency as understood by the enacting
Congress").
94. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.1, at 10:105 n.2 (acknowledging the "pro-
arbitration policy"). The "pro-arbitration policy" means that ambiguities in the parties'
arbitration agreement should be interpreted in a way that ensures that the parties actually
arbitrate their dispute. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983) ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.").
95. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221 (noting a "conflict between two goals of the Arbitration
Act").
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as in the case of expanded review provisions-the court must decide which
policy prevails.96 The Supreme Court, for example, has decided that
parties' freedom to choose arbitration should prevail over a claim that
arbitration, in a particular case, would be inefficient. 97 In contrast, the
Court has also held, in Hall Street, that finality should prevail over parties'
freedom to expand the scope of judicial review under the FAA.98
Moreover, the question this Note addresses-whether the FAA preempts
state laws that permit parties to expand the scope of judicial review-turns
largely on the same policy conflict at issue in Hall Street.99 It also turns on
the FAA's applicability in state court.100 The next section examines the
development of that issue. Specifically, it addresses the FAA's
applicability in both federal and state court as well as the FAA's scope.
C, Applicability and Scope
For purposes of this Note, "applicability" refers to a court's general
obligation, absent a choice of arbitration law clause in the parties'
agreement, to apply the FAA to an arbitration agreement within the FAA's
scope. "Scope," in turn, refers to the FAA's reach in governing arbitration
agreements. First, this section discusses the applicability of the FAA in
federal diversity cases. Second, it discusses the applicability of the FAA in
state court cases. Third, it discusses the scope of the FAA in both federal
and state court.
1. Applicability in Federal Diversity Cases10'
The view that Congress enacted the FAA based on its power to prescribe
procedure in federal courts threatened to severely limit the FAA's
applicability in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins 102 and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America.10 3 After
Erie, Congress could no longer fashion substantive rules of decision based
solely on its power to control jurisdiction in the federal courts. 104 Instead,
96. See id. (choosing enforcement of the parties' agreement over efficiency).
97. See id.; infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
98. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404-06 (2008).
99. See infra Part II.A.2.
100. See infra Part II.A. 1.
101. In cases where the underlying cause of action is based on federal law, the FAA
unquestionably applies. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.1, at 10:75 ("[W]here
arbitrators award remedies for the violation of substantive federal rights, federal substantive
law and the FAA govern their powers, not state law of any kind.").
102. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). The view that the FAA is based on Congress's power to
prescribe federal court rules became problematic because it raised a significant concern that
the FAA may only be applied in cases where the controversy underlying the arbitration
agreement was one involving federal law, and not in diversity cases. See Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the concern about the
FAA's applicability in light of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. ofAmerica).
104. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see Southland, 465 U.S. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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federal courts whose jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship were
obligated to apply state substantive law. 10 5 Bernhardt, in turn, decided that
the legal obligation to arbitrate a dispute was a substantive one. 106
Bernhardt reasoned that because the obligation to arbitrate a dispute could
affect the outcome of the controversy, such an obligation was one of
substantive law. 107 Therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity should
apply state law of arbitrability, and not the FAA, to a diversity action,
unless the subject matter of the action was one over which Congress had
authority-that is, for example, interstate commerce. 10 8  Justice Felix
Frankfurter, nonetheless, in a concurring opinion, expressed the concern
that application of the FAA in any diversity action could be constitutionally
problematic. 109
The Court addressed the constitutional concern in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. "10 In Prima Paint, the court grounded
the FAA in Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.111  The
Court defined the constitutional issue not as whether Congress could create
substantive rules in diversity cases generally, but whether it could create
rules for federal courts to follow in a subject matter area where Congress's
authority to legislate was well established. 112 The Court answered that
Congress could make such rules. 113  Congress's authority to control
interstate commerce, the Court said, was "incontestable." 114 The Court thus
"confined"11 5 the FAA to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
and, in doing so, made the FAA generally applicable in federal diversity
cases, as long as the case involved interstate commerce. 116 The Court's
decision in Prima Paint opened the door for its decision in Southland Corp.
v. Keating,117 where it decided that the FAA was applicable in state, as well
as federal, court. l 1 8
105. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967). Federal courts, however,
were not obligated to apply state substantive law if the Constitution or a federal statute
governed the case. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State."). A comprehensive analysis of the Erie doctrine and the law applied in federal court
is beyond the scope of this Note, but this brief mention of those concepts serves as important
background information in the development of the FAA's applicability.
106. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-03; see Southland, 465 U.S. at 23 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
107. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
108. See id. at 201-03.
109. Id. at 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).





116. See id. at 406.
117. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
118. Id. at 16.
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2. Applicability in State Court Cases
Southland was the Court's first opportunity to decide whether the FAA
was applicable in state court.1 19 It decided that it was. 120 In reaching its
decision, the Court relied on Prima Paint's implicit suggestion that,
because the FAA was based on Congress's Commerce Clause power, it was
applicable in both state and federal court. 121 The Court also relied on the
legislative history of the FAA.122 The legislative history of the Act, the
Court concluded, suggested that in passing the FAA, Congress sought to
remedy two problems: "the old common-law hostility toward arbitration,
and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of
arbitration agreements."' 123 Congress's attention to the second problem,
therefore, indicated its intent to give the FAA a broad reach,
"unencumbered by state-law constraints."' 124
The Court rejected the idea that the FAA was strictly a procedural
statute. 125 If Congress had intended to create only a set of procedural rules
for the federal courts, it would not have limited the FAA to contracts
"involving commerce." 126 Conversely, invocation of the commerce power
would be necessary for the FAA to apply in state court. 127 Therefore,
Congress's use of the phrase "involving commerce" indicated its intention
that the FAA should apply in state court. 128
Finally, the Court suggested that a contrary approach would create
opportunities for forum shopping. 129 On the facts of Southland, California
law would have made the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable. 130
The FAA, however, would have required enforcement of the agreement. 131
Thus, if the FAA did not apply in California state court, enforcement of the
agreement would depend entirely on which court-state or federal-heard
the action for enforcement. 132 Congress, the Court concluded, could not
have intended that a substantive right based on the Commerce Clause would
be entirely dependent for its enforcement on the parties' choice of forum. 133
Thus, the result of Southland is that the FAA creates substantive law
applicable in both state and federal court. 134 Although this result has been
119. Id. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 16 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 11-12.
122. Id. at 12-14.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Id. at 13-14.
125. Id. at 14-15.
126. Id. at 14 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 14-15.
129. Id. at 15.
130. See id. at 14-15.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16.
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severely criticized as contrary to Congress's intent, 135 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly refused to overrule Southland.136
Although Southland unequivocally held that FAA § 2 applied in state
court, it left open the question whether other provisions of the FAA were
similarly applicable in state court. 137 At least one subsequent Supreme
Court decision has left the question open as well. 138 The probable answer,
discussed and analyzed in Parts II and III, turns largely on the language of
the FAA, its underlying policies, and the relationship of the other FAA
sections to § 2.139 Those same considerations also influenced the Supreme
Court's analysis of the scope of the FAA, which is the subject of the next
section. In contrast to the question of the applicability of the FAA, which
addressed whether the FAA applied in a particular forum, the question of
the FAA's scope deals with whether a parties' agreement falls within the
FAA's reach by virtue of the agreement's connection to interstate
commerce.
3. Scope
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,140 the Court held that the FAA
extended to the full reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 141 As a
result, Dobson made the FAA potentially applicable to nearly every
135. Id. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 285-88 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 139-44
(criticizing Southland's use of legislative history and remarking that much of the Court's
reasoning was "pure and simple nonsense"); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 99, 125 (2006) ("Several justices and almost all of the commentators
who have written about Southland agree that this case was wrongly decided and inconsistent
with congressional intent."); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in
Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 6 ("Southland is wrong, and the justifications
for it are wrong."). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining
the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 105
(2002) (arguing that there is evidence that the framers of the FAA "intended it to apply in
state court").
136. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 983 n.2 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (recognizing Southland's continued validity);
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272 (refusing to overrule Southland despite the support of twenty
attorneys general for doing so).
137. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.10 ("[W]e do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration
Act apply to proceedings in state courts."); see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) ("[W]e have never held that §§ 3 and
4... are nonetheless applicable in state court." (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.10)); see
also MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 149 (noting that after Southland, "[t]he distinct possibility
now exists that some sections of this unitary statute are not enforceable in state court
although others clearly are").
138. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6.
139. See infra Parts II.A.1-2, III.
140. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
141. Id. at 268.
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arbitration agreement.1 42 In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed
§ 2's provision that an arbitration agreement in "a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" 143 should be enforceable.' 44 The Court
first reasoned that the phrase "involving commerce" reflected Congress's
intent to exercise the full extent of its Commerce Clause power. 145 A
narrower reading of the phrase, the Court held, would create a "new,
unfamiliar test lying somewhere in a no man's land between 'in commerce'
and 'affecting commerce." ' 146  Such a test, the Court opined, would
"breed[] litigation from a statute [the FAA] that seeks to avoid it."' 147 The
Court then reasoned that the phrase "a contract evidencing a transaction"'148
referred to any contract for a transaction that in fact touched interstate
commerce, rather than to a contract that the parties, at the time of making
the contract, contemplated as one that would involve interstate
commerce. 149  The Court chose the "commerce in fact" interpretation
because, according to the Court, the other interpretation would undermine
the basic purpose of the FAA by encouraging litigation about the parties'
contemplations at the time they entered into the agreement.' 50 Thus, as
long as a contract involves a transaction that in fact touches interstate
commerce, the contract's arbitration agreement will fall within the FAA's
reach. 151
Dobson gave the FAA broad scope. In doing so, it limited the ability of
state courts to apply their own arbitration law.' 52 As long as a contract with
an arbitration agreement fell within the outer limits of the commerce power,
state courts could no longer apply state arbitration law solely on the
grounds that the arbitration agreement did not sufficiently touch interstate
commerce.1 53  State courts, however, could still attempt to apply state
arbitration law to an agreement involving interstate commerce on the
142. See MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 149 (noting that interstate commerce will "virtually
always" be present in commercial arbitration agreements); Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of
State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1, 35 (2004) ("[V]irtually any
commercial transaction is likely to be controlled by the FAA.").
143. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
144. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 268, 273, 276.
145. Id. at 273-77 (comparing the phrase "involving commerce" to the phrases "affecting
commerce" and "in commerce," which Congress used in other statutes to differentiate the
extent to which it was exercising its commerce power).
146. Id. at 275. Professor Ian R. Macneil and his coauthors find this line of the Court's
reasoning to be a "comfort." 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.3, at 10:86.
147. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 275.
148. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
149. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 277-78.
150. Id. at 278.
151. See id at 281; Drahozal, supra note 57, at 402 ("Because the parties agreed that the
transaction involved in the case was within the scope of the commerce power, the FAA
applied ... ").
152. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272-73. By its broad interpretation of the FAA, the Court
closed off "an important statutory niche in which a State remain[ed] free to apply its
antiarbitration law or policy." Id. at 273.
153. See id. at 273-74.
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grounds that particular FAA provisions did not apply in state court,1 5 4 or on
the grounds that the parties had agreed to apply state arbitration law.' 55 The
validity of these grounds for applying state arbitration law of vacatur is
analyzed in Parts II and III. Furthermore, this Note assumes that all
arbitration agreements involve interstate commerce. This assumption
simplifies the analysis of FAA preemption by eliminating the need to
address the caveat that if the FAA does not apply because the agreement
does not involve commerce, then the FAA will not preempt the state law. 156
The next section sets out the basis for FAA preemption analysis by
examining federal preemption of state law generally.
D. Preemption
1. Generally
Congress may only legislate in certain areas of law. 157 In most of those
areas, state legislatures may also make laws. 158 Thus there are significant
areas of law where federal and state powers overlap. 159 In areas where
Congress has authority to legislate, however, it also has the power to
preempt-or displace-state law. 160 Congress's power to preempt state law
is derived from the Supremacy Clause, 161 and courts, in discharging their
duty to interpret the law, determine whether federal law preempts state
law. 162 The answer is ultimately a question of congressional intent. 163
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has identified three categories of
preemption that can occur: express preemption, field preemption, and
conflict preemption.164 Each is addressed below.
154. See infra notes 381-88 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Parts I.D.2.c, II.C.
156. See M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 142
(D.R.I. 1999) (holding a state arbitration law preempted but acknowledging that the holding
did not affect certain state cases because those cases did not involve interstate commerce).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1445-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
Congress "may exercise only those powers enumerated in the Constitution" (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819))).
158. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-20 (1997) (acknowledging
concurrent state and federal authority); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225
(2000).
159. Nelson, supra note 158, at 225.
160. See id.
161. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 142 (1977) (per curiam); Nelson, supra note 158,
at 234; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
162. See Nelson, supra note 158, at 226-27 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's
approach to determining the preemptive effect of federal law).
163. Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local
1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963) ("The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone."); Drahozal, supra note 57, at 397.
164. Nelson, supra note 158, at 226; see Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (recognizing three
types of preemption).
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Express preemption occurs when a federal law includes a clause that
expressly removes legislative authority from the states in a particular area
of law. 165 Though Congress's authority to expressly preempt state law is
well settled, 166 the Supreme Court favors reading express preemption
clauses narrowly. 167 This is especially true when Congress is legislating in
an area that is traditionally within the scope of the states' power to pass
laws for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 168 The FAA,
however, does not have an express preemption provision. 169
Field preemption occurs where Congress has impliedly occupied the
entire field of a particular area of law. 170 Field preemption occurs when
Congress has legislated "so pervasive[ly]" that it has "left no room" for
states to pass additional laws in that field. 171 It may also occur where
Congress is legislating in an area and the federal interest in that area is so
dominant that states should not be permitted to enforce their own laws on
the subject. 172 Field preemption, however, is rare, 173 and Congress has not
preempted the entire field of arbitration law with the FAA. 174
Federal law also preempts state law when the two "actually conflict[]"
with each other. 175 This is called conflict preemption, 176 and it may occur
when compliance with both the state law and federal law is a "physical
impossibility."' 177 It may also occur when the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
165. Id.; see, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2006) (containing an express preemption provision).
166. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203 (1983) ("It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-
empt state authority by so stating in express terms." (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
167. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1992); Nelson, supra
note 158, at 227.
168. Nelson, supra note 158, at 227; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996).
169. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989). But see Nelson, supra note 158, at 299 ("But § 2 [of the FAA] can readily be
recast in the form of an express preemption clause; for most purposes, it is identical to a
provision that 'no state or local government shall adopt or enforce any law or policy that
makes a written arbitration agreement in a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce invalid, revocable, or unenforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."').
170. Nelson, supra note 158, at 227.
171. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Nelson, supra note 158,
at 227.
172. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
173. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Nelson, supra note 158, at 227.
174. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. But see I MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76-
:81 (offering arguments in favor of the view that the FAA preempts all state arbitration
laws).
175. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
176. Nelson, supra note 158, at 227-28.
177. Id. at 228.
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objectives of Congress."' 178 This type of conflict preemption is called
obstacle preemption 179 and is the type of preemption most applicable to the
FAA. 180 The next section discusses the issue of FAA preemption of state
law in detail.
2. FAA Preemption of State Law
This section examines the preemptive effect of the FAA on contrary state
law. First, it examines the general principles of FAA preemption. Second,
it examines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject. In that
context, it examines the Court's cases involving the preemptive effect of
§ 2's mandate that agreements to arbitrate be held "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." 18 1 Third, this section examines the preemption of state law
by other sections of the FAA. Finally, it examines the effect of preemption
on a choice of arbitration law clause in the parties' agreement.
The doctrine of conflict preemption prevents a state law from "stand[ing]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'182 This requirement leads to the core principle of
FAA preemption: "state arbitration law cannot limit or obstruct FAA
provisions."' 183  This section will examine this principle under the
assumption that the parties have not explicitly agreed that state arbitration
law would govern their agreement. 184
a. Section 2
Most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the preemptive effect of
the FAA involves the application of § 2 to state laws that attempt to limit
arbitrability of claims. 185 The Court's decisions in this area rely on the
assertion that Congress's primary purpose in enacting § 2 was to hold
parties to their agreements to arbitrate by making the agreements
178. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501,
533 (1912)).
179. Nelson, supra note 158, at 228-29.
180. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (noting that the FAA preempts state laws through obstacle
preemption).
181. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
182. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (citing Savage, 225 U.S. at 533); see supra notes 175-78 and
accompanying text.
183. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.1, at 10:74 (calling the above quoted
principle "[t]he bedrock for considering the scope of FAA preemption"). Professor Macneil
and his coauthors draw this principle from Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987); and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See I MACNEIL ET
AL.,supra note 29, § 10.8.1.3, at 10:73 n.31.
184. For the effect of a choice of arbitration law clause on the analysis, see infra Part
I.D.2.c.
185. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 (explaining that the
Supreme Court has left open the applicability and preemptive effect of sections other than
§ 2).
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enforceable in court. 186 Thus, the FAA created a "national policy favoring
arbitration,"' 187 and it therefore preempts state laws that undermine § 2's
command that arbitration agreements be held "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable."1 88
In Southland, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a provision of the
California Franchise Investment Law that the California Supreme Court
interpreted to require a judicial, rather than arbitral, forum for resolving
disputes that arose under the law. 189 As a result, the California Supreme
Court refused to enforce the parties' arbitration agreement, at least to the
extent that it involved claims under the Franchise Investment Law. 190 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the California law requiring a judicial forum
for resolution was preempted. 191 After determining that § 2 of the FAA
applied in state court, the Court concluded that the California law was an
"attempt[] to undercut the enforceability of [the] arbitration
agreement[]."' 192 The California law, the Court reasoned, was in conflict
with Congress's purpose in enacting § 2.193 Therefore, it violated the
Supremacy Clause and was preempted. 194
The Court faced a similar set of facts when it decided Perry v.
Thomas. 195 In Perry, an employee sought judicial resolution of his claim
against his employer for unpaid commissions, despite the fact that his
employment agreement contained an arbitration clause that would have
governed the dispute. 196 The employee relied on section 229 of the
California Labor Code, which permitted court actions "for the collection of
wages . . . 'without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate."-' 197 The Court found that the state law was preempted.198
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,199 the Court again found that
the FAA preempted a contrary state law. 200 Unlike the state laws in
Southland and Perry, however, the Montana law at issue in Casarotto, on
its face, did not restrict the arbitrability of any particular types of claims,
186. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684-85; Perry, 482 U.S. at 489; Southland, 465 U.S. at
10.
187. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
188. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
189. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 2006).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 16; see supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Southland's analysis of the FAA's
applicability in state court).
193. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
194. Id.
195. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
196. See id. at 484-85.
197. Id. at 484 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971)).
198. See id. at 491 ("[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must give way.").
The result will be the same when a state law attempts to provide an administrative, rather
than judicial, forum for relief despite an agreement to arbitrate. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S.
Ct. 978, 981 (2008).
199. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
200. Id. at 688.
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nor did it invalidate arbitration agreements generally. 20 1 Instead, the law in
Casarotto required that any contract containing an arbitration clause must
also contain a provision notifying the parties that the agreement is subject to
arbitration. 20 2 The notice was required to be "'typed in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract."' 203 If the notice provision did not
comply with the statute, "'the contract may not be subject to
arbitration.' 20 4  The Montana Supreme Court held that this provision
rendered the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable because the
agreement lacked the required notice provision.20 5 The Montana court
reasoned that the Montana notice requirement did not contravene the
policies of the FAA because it did not, as a rule, invalidate arbitration
agreements generally. 20 6 The Montana law merely reflected that state's
policy that arbitration agreements should be entered knowingly before they
are enforced. 20 7
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on the provision of FAA § 2
that arbitration agreements should be enforced "save upon such grounds...
for the revocation of any contract, ' 20 8 the Court reasoned that the Montana
notice provision violated § 2 because it singled out arbitration agreements
and made their enforcement contingent upon special requirements "not
applicable to contracts generally." 20 9 Application of the Montana statute,
moreover, would make the entire arbitration agreement invalid.210 Such a
result, the Court held, would be "antithetical" to the purposes of the
FAA. 211 Therefore, the Montana law was preempted.212
The foregoing discussion dealt with the preemptive effect of § 2 on
conflicting state laws. The next section examines existing law on the issue
of whether other sections of the FAA have a similar preemptive effect.
b. Beyond § 2
In federal diversity cases, all sections of the FAA govern,213 unless the
parties have specifically agreed that state arbitration law will apply to their
201. See id. at 685 (noting the Montana Supreme Court's reasoning that the law "did not
preclude arbitration agreements altogether"); see also Drahozal, supra note 57, at 403
(noting, after discussing Southland and Perry, that, in Casarotto, "the Court held preempted
a different type of state statute than those it had faced previously").
202. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683.
203. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (amended 1997)).
204. Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 685 (recounting the Montana court's analysis).
207. Id.
208. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
209. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
210. Id. at 688.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:80 ("In federal courts, all the
sections of the comprehensive FAA will govern.").
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agreement. 214 Thus, in a diversity case, the FAA will preempt any state law
that is different from any of its provisions, unless the parties have
specifically agreed to those different rules. 215
In state court, the analysis is more complicated. The Supreme Court has
not definitively addressed the preemptive effect in state court of FAA
sections other than §§ 1 and 2.216 It has not held that, without an agreement
to apply state arbitration law, other sections of the FAA preempt contrary
state law in cases heard in state court. 217 The essential question on this
topic is whether other sections of the FAA apply in state court. 218 If they
do, they preempt contrary state laws, unless the parties have, within certain
limits, agreed to apply those contrary state laws.219 If the FAA provisions
do not apply in state court, then they only preempt state laws that
undermine the policies of the FAA.220 This question is related to the
214. See infra Parts I.D.2.c, II.C.
215. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.3, at 10:87 ("When [the parties] have not
chosen state arbitration law, the court should, at the very least, exclude its application if it is
even a slight hindrance to achieving the FAA's goals and policies."); Gross, supra note 142,
at 16 (describing the issue of whether other FAA sections preempt state laws and
acknowledging, "In federal court, the issue arises only if the parties' arbitration agreement
includes a choice-of-law clause designating a state's law"); see also Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
("[B]ecause Congress has specified standards for confirming an arbitration award, federal
courts must act pursuant to those standards and no others."); Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.) (acknowledging that there is a "presumption that the FAA
supplies the rules for arbitration"), amended by 289 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2002).
216. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 n.6 (1989) ("[W]e have never held that §§ 3 and 4... are nonetheless applicable in
state court."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.l0 (1984) ("[W]e do not hold
that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts."); see also 1
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3. 1, at 10:97 ("As to other sections [of the FAA], the
Supreme Court has in certain respects left the issue of FAA applicability wide open.");
Drahozal, supra note 57, at 395 (noting that "[c]ourts have only begun to address preemption
challenges to state laws regulating the arbitration process"); Huber, supra note 21, at 530
(arguing that the Court's treatment of FAA preemption is "limited" and that "[o]nly sections
I and 2 of the FAA preempt state law").
217. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 & n.6; Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 & n.10.
218. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 (phrasing the issue of
preemption of other FAA sections in terms of those sections' applicability); see also Volt,
489 U.S. at 476-77 (acknowledging that the argument that FAA sections cannot preempt
state laws in state courts if those FAA sections do not apply in state court "is not without
some merit"); Huber, supra note 21, at 530-31 (arguing that FAA sections other than § 2
cannot preempt state laws in state courts because the statutory language of those sections
makes them inapplicable in state courts).
219. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 (discussing preemption in
state .court and noting, "One thing remains clear, however: state law may not contravene
FAA provisions"); cf STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
§ 2.46, at 125 (2d ed. 2007) ("Federal law preempts state grounds for vacatur not found in
federal law.").
220. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:93 (describing a three step
analysis for determining whether, if a state court determines that a particular FAA provision
does not apply in state court, that particular state law is nonetheless preempted). Step three
asks, "Do those state rules limit or obstruct explicit FAA provisions. . . ?" Id. If they do, the
state laws are preempted. Id.; see Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall
Street Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption 22 (St. John's Univ.
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question of the applicability of particular sections because the applicability
question will often be analyzed with reference to the policies underlying the
FAA.221 Further, an initial determination that a particular FAA provision
does not apply in state court followed by a subsequent determination that
application of a related state law will undermine the policies of the FAA
will result in application of the FAA provision.222 With respect to § 10 of
the FAA and state vacatur law, these issues are discussed in detail in Part
11.223 However, this section presents background information about the
preemptive effect scholars and courts have attributed to FAA sections apart
from § 2.
An FAA section can be applicable in state court in two ways. It may
either apply by its terms, or it may apply as an "emanation[]" from § 2.224
A number of FAA sections, most notably §§ 3, 4, and 10, contain language
directed at "courts of the United States,"225 "United States district
court[s]," 226 and "the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made."227 By their terms, these sections do not apply in state
court.228 However, even if a section does not apply by its terms, it may still
apply as an "emanation[]" from § 2.229 This idea describes a situation
where § 2's command that arbitration agreements be enforced cannot be
fully honored without applying other FAA provisions. 230 Sections 3 and 4
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-0177, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1473882 (making the assumption that state law governs
postarbitration proceedings, but acknowledging that "there is potentially an additional layer
of inquiry," which is whether the state law conflicts with the policies of the FAA).
221. See Gross, supra note 142, at 29-31 (using the argument that most state vacatur laws
do not undermine the policies of the FAA to support the conclusion that FAA § 10 does not
apply in state court).
222. See 1 MACNEIL ETAL.,supra note 29, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:93. Professor Macneil and his
coauthors acknowledge that this point-that an ostensibly inapplicable FAA provision is
nonetheless applicable because a related state rule undermines the policies of the FAA-
"may seem odd," but, they continue, "no alternative exists once a state rule has been found
to be anti-FAA and, hence, inapplicable." Id.
223. See infra Part II.A.
224. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:99; see also Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that by requiring state
courts to enforce § 2, the majority opinion essentially forces state courts to also enforce §§ 3
and 4 because of their relationship to § 2).
225. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
226. Id. § 4.
227. Id. § 10.
228. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 n.6 (1989) (noting that §§ 3 and 4 "by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in
federal court"); Huber, supra note 21, at 530-31; see 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29,
§ 10.8.2.4, at 10:89 ("[T]he Court still had to do something about the provisions that
Congress simply could not have intended to apply to state courts.").
229. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97-:99.
230. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Tom Cullinan, Note, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration
Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REv. 395, 416 (1998) (noting that state vacatur laws should be
preempted, and the FAA thus applicable, when the state laws permit an expanded role for the
judiciary in reviewing awards because that expanded role "undermines [§ 2's] command of
enforcement").
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provide an example. In order to effectively enforce an agreement to
arbitrate, a court must stay a trial of an arbitrable issue and order the parties
to arbitrate. 231  Other remedies-like damages for breach of contract-
would be inadequate to ensure that the parties, in fact, did proceed to
arbitration according to their agreement, as required by § 2.232 Thus, when
an FAA provision "speak[s] to the most essential dimensions of the
commercial arbitration process," 233 in the sense that it must be applied in
order to give effect to § 2's command of enforceability, then that FAA
provision should, as an analytical matter, apply in state court. 234 Section
10's relationship to § 2 in this regard is examined in detail in Part II.A. L.b
and Part III.B.
However, even if a particular FAA provision does apply in a particular
court, the parties may agree to arbitrate under different rules. The Supreme
Court's analysis of this issue is discussed next.
c. Volt: The Effect of a Choice of Law Clause
Where the parties have included a provision in their agreement that state
arbitration law will apply, the preemption analysis is different.235 In those
cases, courts may be justified in applying a state law that otherwise would
be preempted by the FAA as long as the application of the state law does
not undermine the policies of the FAA.236 The Supreme Court articulated
this principle in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University.237
231. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court reads § 2 to
require state courts to enforce § 2 rights using procedures that mimic those specified for
federal courts by FAA §§ 3 and 4."). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor thus concludes that "the
Court has made § 3 of the FAA binding on the state courts." Id. at 31 n.20; see also Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) ("[S]tate courts, as
much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration
Act.").
232. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 31-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority's opinion prevents state courts from providing any other remedy for breach of an
agreement to arbitrate other than specific enforcement).
233. Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 67, 75.
234. See id.
235. See Drahozal, supra note 57, at 411-12 (describing a situation where, under ordinary
preemption principles, a state law would be preempted, but, because of the parties' choice of
arbitration law clause, it is not).
236. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 485 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an agreement to arbitrate outside the
FAA "would permit a state rule, otherwise preempted by the FAA, to govern [the]
arbitration"); 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.1, at 10:107; Drahozal, supra note 57,
at 411-12.
237. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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In Volt, the parties included a choice of law clause in their contract. 238
Their contract also contained an arbitration clause.239 The California Court
of Appeal interpreted the choice of law clause to mean that the parties
intended California arbitration law to apply to their arbitration
agreement. 240 California arbitration law, in turn, permitted a court to grant
a stay of arbitration while a party to the arbitration litigated a related dispute
with a third party. 241 The Supreme Court held that the California law was
not preempted,242 even though the FAA would have permitted the
arbitration to proceed despite the related litigation. 243
First, the Court deferred to the California Court of Appeal's
interpretation of the choice of law clause.244 The Court stated that the
interpretation of the choice of law clause was a question of state contract
law and therefore a matter reserved for the state courts.245 Nonetheless, the
Court considered-and rejected-two arguments for setting aside the
California court's interpretation. First, the Court rejected the argument that
interpreting the choice of law clause to incorporate California arbitration
law would amount to a waiver of FAA § 4's "'federally guaranteed right to
compel arbitration."' 246 The validity of such a waiver, the appellant argued,
was a question of federal law that the Court should review.247 The Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that, contrary to the appellant's
contention, the California court had not authorized a waiver of a federal
right to compel arbitration. 248 Instead, the California court simply found
that, by incorporating California arbitration law into the agreement, the
parties agreed that there would be no right to compel arbitration in the
circumstances contemplated by the California law. 249 Thus, the Court
238. Id. at 470. The choice of law clause stated that the "Contract shall be governed by





242. Id. at 472-73 (affirming the California court's decision that the California law was
not preempted).
243. Id. at 479.
244. Id. at 474-76 (rejecting arguments that the California court's interpretation of the
choice of law clause should be set aside); Drahozal, supra note 57, at 405. This deference
has been criticized. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Sanchez Espada, 959 F. Supp. 73, 83
(D.P.R. 1997).
245. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 474 ("[T]he interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a
question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review."). But see id. at 485 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the question of whether parties have agreed to arbitrate
according to state law is a question of federal law).
246. Id. at 474-75 (majority opinion) (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (No. 87-
1318)).
247. Id. at 474.
248. See id. at 475.
249. Id.
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concluded, there was no waiver of a right because there was "no such right
in the first place." 250
The doctrine of incorporation by reference helps explain the Court's
reasoning here.251 By finding that the parties had agreed that California
arbitration law would govern their agreement, the California court
essentially found that the parties made the provisions of California
arbitration law provisions of their own agreement. 252 Thus, the parties in
Volt, in effect, agreed that their arbitration would not proceed if there was
related litigation pending between either party to the arbitration and a third
party.253 Section 4 of the FAA, which permits parties to apply for a court
order compelling arbitration, 254 would not prohibit the parties from making
such an agreement because § 4 only authorizes courts to compel arbitration
"'in the manner provided for in [the parties 'I agreement.'' 255 Under the
particular circumstances in Volt, the agreement did not provide for
arbitration. 256 Thus, "there [was] nothing for the FAA to preempt. '257
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the California court's
interpretation of the choice of law clause violated the "pro-arbitration"
policy2 58 of the FAA. 259 The Court reasoned that "[tihere is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules. '260
Therefore, the Court concluded, there is no harm in interpreting an
agreement to incorporate a set of rules that "are manifestly designed to
encourage resort to the arbitral process." 261
After upholding the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of the
choice of law clause, the Supreme Court addressed the preemption issue-
that is, whether application of the California law, "in accordance with the
terms of the arbitration agreement itself, would undermine the goals and
policies of the FAA. '262 The Court held that it would not.263 Emphasizing
the parties' freedom to shape their arbitration agreements,264 the Court
250. Id.
251. See Drahozal, supra note 57, at 411.
252. See id. ("If the parties incorporate a state arbitration law by reference into their
arbitration agreement, that law becomes part of their agreement . .
253. Volt, 489 U.S. at 475.
254. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
255. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-75 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4) (holding
that § 4 does not give parties the right to compel arbitration under any circumstances, only
when their agreement provides for it).
256. Id. at 475.
257. Drahozal, supra note 57, at 412.
258. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
259. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 477-78.
263. Id. at 478.
264. See id. ("[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed
to do so . . . nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain
claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement ... " (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
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reasoned that enforcing an agreement that provides for "different rules than
those set forth in the Act itself' would not undermine "the FAA's primary
purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms." 265  To the contrary, enforcing the parties'
agreement would serve to "give effect to the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind by
the FAA."'26 6  Thus, the Court held, the California law was not
preempted.267
Parties' freedom to choose state arbitration law, however, is not
unlimited. 268  State laws will still be preempted if their application
contravenes the policies and purposes of the FAA.269 The extent of the
FAA's role in this context, however, is still uncertain. 270 One group of
scholars, for example, suggests that Volt was intended to restrict parties'
freedom to choose state arbitration only to the extent that the chosen state's
entire body of arbitration law, as a whole, was hostile to arbitration. 271 The
effect of an individual law on the policies of the FAA, they argue, was not
intended to be the touchstone in determining the limitations on Volt.2 7 2
Thus, a proper application of Volt should result in a situation where state
law applies and the FAA is wholly excluded, unless the entire body of state
arbitration law, as a whole, undermines the policies of the FAA.273
The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that this is not necessarily
the case. In Casarotto, for example, the Court compared the state law at
issue in Volt to the Montana notice requirement at issue in Casarotto.274
Referring primarily to the individual rule at issue in Volt rather than to
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 406 (1967))).
265. Id. at 479.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 478.
268. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:114 ("Volt apparently does
not give parties carte blanche to escape the FAA when it would otherwise apply."); Chafetz,
supra note 11, at 11-12 (discussing the limiting language of Volt and noting specifically that
the Court's use of the phrase "generally free" suggests that parties do not have "unfettered
discretion to agree to any provision").
269. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:114-:115; Hayford, supra note
233, at 72.
270. See 1 MACNEW ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:115 (noting that "this aspect
of the case is murky"); Faith A. Kaminsky, Note, Arbitration Law: Choice-of-Law Clauses
and the Power To Choose Between State and Federal Law, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 527,
528 (acknowledging that "the extent to which parties can opt out of the FAA remains
unclear").
271. See I MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.3, at 10:85.
272. See id. § 10.9.2.2, at 10:115 (noting that, in Volt, "[t]he Court was not, therefore,
deterred from enforcing a particular rule that in itself might be thought to undermine the
FAA's goals and policies").
273. See id. § 10.8.2.3, at 10:85 ("Both that context and careful reading suggest that the
Court was concerned only with circumstances where the FAA did not apply at all except as,
at most, a kind of umbrella precluding application of an agreed-to state arbitration law with
an overall hostility to arbitration.").
274. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
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California's body of arbitration law as a whole,275 the Court suggested that
the particular Montana law at issue in Casarotto would have been
preempted even if the parties agreed that Montana arbitration law would
apply. 276 Thus, the possibility remains that even where the parties have
agreed that state arbitration law will apply, a particular state law that
conflicts with the policies of the FAA may be preempted, even if it is part
of a body of arbitration law that, in total, is not hostile to arbitration.
Another limitation on parties' freedom to choose state arbitration law is
the willingness of a reviewing court to interpret the agreement as actually
incorporating state arbitration law. 277 The Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.278 In Mastrobuono,
an arbitrator awarded punitive damages to an investor in an action against
the investor's broker.279 The parties' agreement contained both a choice of
law clause and an arbitration clause. 280 The choice of law clause provided
that the contract "shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York."'281 New York law, however, prohibited arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages.282 The broker argued that the parties' choice of law
clause incorporated the New York prohibition on punitive damages into the
arbitration agreement; 283 therefore, under Volt, the award of punitive
damages should be vacated because the arbitrator, in effect, rendered a
decision on a claim that the parties did not agree to arbitrate.284 The
broker's argument succeeded in the lower courts. 285 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed.286
275. See id. ("The state rule examined in Volt determined only the efficient order of
proceedings .... We held that applying the state rule would not 'undermine the goals and
policies of the FAA' ...." (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989))).
276. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:115-:116 (discussing Casarotto
and noting that "the clear implication of its language is that, even if the parties had chosen
Montana arbitration law to govern, the Montana formality requirements would have
conflicted with the FAA and hence would not have governed"); see Casarotto, 517 U.S. at
688 (comparing the laws at issue in Volt Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University and Casarotto and using that comparison to support the
conclusion that the Montana law at issue in Casarotto was preempted).
277. See Kaminsky, supra note 270, at 528 (noting that courts have struggled to apply
Volt because of the difficulties of discerning (1) the parties' intent with respect to the
arbitration law they intended to govern their agreement and (2) the extent to which parties
are permitted to opt out of the FAA).
278. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
279. Id. at 53-55.
280. See id. at 58 n.2.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 55 ("[T]he New York Court of Appeals has decided that in New York the
power to award punitive damages is limited to judicial tribunals and may not be exercised by
arbitrators .... (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976))).
283. Id. at 56-57.
284. See id. at 58.
285. Id. at 54-55.
286. Id. at 55.
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The Court acknowledged that parties could lawfully exclude punitive
damages claims from their arbitration agreements.287 However, the Court
also acknowledged that, absent the parties' clear intent to do so, such claims
would not be excluded and the FAA would preempt the New York rule to
the contrary. 288 The question, then, was whether the parties intended the
generic choice of law clause to incorporate New York arbitration law and
its corresponding prohibition on punitive damages.289 The Court held that
the parties did not so intend.290
The Court held that the choice of law clause was best read as a
declaration that New York law would govern the "rights and duties of the
parties" in the underlying dispute.291 The clause, the Court held, should not
be read to include New York's "special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators." 292 The Court therefore found that the parties lacked the intent
to exclude punitive damage claims and ordered enforcement of the
award.293 Other cases have similarly held that generic choice of law
clauses are insufficient to incorporate state arbitration law into the parties'
agreement. 294 Thus, if parties want state arbitration law to apply, their
intent must be "abundantly clear."295
Much of the background information up to this point has described the
principles of FAA preemption. These principles provide the context for the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street. Hall Street, however, was not a
case about preemption. Instead, it was a case about the proper
interpretation of FAA §§ 9, 10, and 11 and their impact on clauses that
purported to expand the grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards
beyond the grounds enumerated in those sections. Nonetheless, the Court's
interpretation of those FAA sections, which is discussed in detail in the next
section, raises the distinct possibility that, under the principles discussed
previously, state laws that take a contrary view are preempted.
287. See id. at 57-58.
288. Id. at 59.
289. See id. at 58.
290. Id. at 61.
291. Id. at 63-64.
292. Id. at 64.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001),
abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008); Coleman v. Assurant, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 862, 868 (D. Nev. 2007); L & L
Kempwood Assocs., L.P. v. Omega Builders, Inc. (In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P.), 9
S.W.3d 125, 127-28 (Tex. 1999); see also Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in
Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption
of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 556 (1994) ("[I1t is almost certainly a bad job of
contractual interpretation to read a typical choice-of-law clause in an arbitration agreement
as choosing to be governed by state arbitration law that would otherwise be preempted by
the FAA.").
295. UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998);
see Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997); Precision Press, Inc.
v. MLP U.S.A., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 981, 990 (N.D. Iowa 2009); Lefkowitz v. HWF
Holdings, LLC, No. 438 1-VCP, 2009 WL 3806299, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2009).
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E. Hall Street
In May 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street296 to
resolve a circuit split regarding the validity of expanded review provisions
under the FAA.297 Relying largely on the text of the FAA, the Court held
that the FAA's grounds for review were exclusive and could not be
expanded by private contract.298
Hall Street involved a dispute over a lease. 299 Mattel, the tenant, wanted
to terminate the lease because the property was polluted.300 When Mattel
gave notice of its intent to terminate, the landlord, Hall Street Associates,
objected.301 Hall Street claimed that Mattel could not terminate the lease
on its intended date.302 Further, Hall Street claimed that the lease required
Mattel to indemnify Hall Street for the costs of cleaning up the pollution. 30 3
The parties took their dispute to court, where the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon found that Mattel was permitted to terminate the lease on
the date it chose. 304 The court, however, did not decide the indemnification
issue because the parties agreed to submit that issue to arbitration. 305 The
court approved the parties' agreement and entered it as a court order.30 6
The agreement contained the following expanded review provision: "The
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the
arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous. ' 30 7 After an award was
rendered in favor of Mattel, Hall Street sought a court order vacating the
award. 308  The arbitrator, Hall Street claimed, made a legal error.309
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the district court vacated the award and
the arbitrator amended his decision.310 The subsequent appeal process
296. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2875, 2875 (2007) (granting
certiorari).
297. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 & n.5 (2008). The
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits comprised one side of the split,
holding that parties may not expand the grounds for judicial review by contract. See Kyocera
Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001). The other side of the
split was comprised of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits; these courts held that parties could expand the grounds for review by contract. See
P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31(st Cir. 2005); Jacada (Eur.), Ltd.
v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway, 257 F.3d at 288;
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
298. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.








307. Id. at 1400-01.





eventually reached the Supreme Court.31' There, Mattel argued that the
FAA provided the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award and
that parties may not expand those grounds by contract. 312 The Supreme
Court agreed. 313
The Court began its analysis by addressing two of Hall Street's
arguments in favor of permitting parties to expand judicial review by
contract. Hall Street first argued that FAA § 10 was not exclusive because
the Supreme Court itself had recognized grounds for review outside those
enumerated in § 10.314  Specifically, Hall Street argued, the Court
recognized "manifest disregard of the law" as a ground for reviewing an
award.315 Therefore, FAA § 10 was not exclusive and parties could expand
the grounds for review by private contract. 316 The Court disagreed on three
grounds. First, the Court disagreed with Hall Street's logical "leap," which
equated a judge's ability to expand the grounds for review through
interpretation with the parties' ability to do the same by contract. 317
Second, the Court disagreed with Hall Street's definitive interpretation of
"manifest disregard of the law" as a ground for review wholly outside the
enumerated provisions.318 Third, the Court noted that the language in
Wilko v. Swan,319 which Hall Street offered to support its position,320
expressly prohibited the exact thing Hall Street was asking the Court to
permit in this case: "general review for an arbitrator's legal errors. '321
Hall Street then argued that its agreement to expand the grounds for
judicial review should be enforced because the purpose of the FAA was to
enforce parties' agreements to arbitrate.322 The Court again disagreed. 323
The Court acknowledged that the parties' freedom to shape arbitral
311. See id. (describing the winding route the case took to get to the Supreme Court).
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. Seeid. at 1403.
315. See id. Hall Street argued that the Court's previous decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), recognized "manifest disregard of the law" as an
independent ground for review. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
316. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
317. See id. at 1404.
318. See id. ("Maybe the term 'manifest disregard' was meant to name a new ground for
review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to
them."). The Court's treatment of the "manifest disregard" issue has lead to a significant
circuit split about the continued validity of the doctrine. See generally Hiro N. Aragaki, The
Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2009),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/817/20/.
319. 346 U.S. 427, overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477.
320. Hall Street Associates relied on the following language from Wilko: "the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject,
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-
37.
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proceedings was an important aspect of the arbitration process. 324
However, that freedom did not extend as far as Hall Street suggested; the
text of the FAA, the Court said, prohibited such a result.325
Construing the statutory text, the Court reached two conclusions. First,
the Court held that "the old rule of ejusdem generis"326 did not permit
supplementation of the enumerated grounds of § 10 to the point of
authorizing vacatur for legal error. 327 Second, the Court held that the
language of § 9, which provides that a court "must grant"328 an order
confirming an award unless the award is vacated according to § 10, was not
a default provision that parties could alter by contract.329
The Court's first conclusion relied on the substantial difference between
legal and evidentiary errors on the one hand and the enumerated grounds for
vacatur listed in § 10 on the other.330 Section 10's grounds for vacatur-
"corruption," "fraud," "evident partiality," and the like--deal with
"egregious" and "outrageous conduct."' 33 1 Mistakes of law, the Court held,
are simply not the same.332 The Court supported its holding with reference
to the canon of ejusdem generis.333 The Court explained that when a statute
contains a series of specific terms followed by a general term, the general
term should be interpreted only to include "subjects comparable to the
specifics it follows." 334  Section 10, the Court continued, did not even
contain such a general term.335 Therefore, it would be unreasonable to
interpret § 10 as allowing expansion to the point of legal error. 336 Because
§ 10 arguably lacks a textual basis for expansion altogether, allowing
expansion to the point of legal error would go far beyond what is
"comparable" to the enumerated terms. 337 Thus, § 10 forecloses such broad
expansion. 338
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1404-05. In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's rejection of the
freedom of contract argument as "flatly inconsistent with the overriding interest [of the
FAA] in effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting parties." Id. at 1409
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 1404 (majority opinion). Ejusdem generis can be defined as "[a] canon of
construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those
listed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (9th ed. 2009).
327. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
328. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
329. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
330. See id. at 1404-05.
331. Id. at 1404; see 9 U.S.C. § 10.
332. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
333. See id.
334. Id. at 1404.
335. See id.
336. Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the majority's application of ejusdem
generis as "wooden." Id. at 1409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. See id. at 1404 (majority opinion).
338. Id. at 1406 ("[T]he statutory text gives us no business to expand the statutory
grounds.").
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The Court's second conclusion relied on the text of § 9. The Court held
that the language of § 9, which provides that a court "must grant" 339 an
order confirming an award "unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11, ' 340 was not a default
provision that could be altered by private contract.341 The language, the
Court held, contained "nothing malleable," and "unequivocally tells courts
to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the 'prescribed'
exceptions applies." 342 The Court then compared § 9 to § 5, which the
Court described as "an example of what Congress thought a default
provision would look like. ' 343 The two provisions, the Court suggested,
simply could not both be read as default provisions. 344 Therefore, the Court
held that § 10's grounds for vacatur could not be supplemented by
contract. 34
5
The Court's decision prized the finality of the arbitration process over the
parties' autonomy in shaping that process. 346 In doing so, the Court
recognized that the FAA "substantiat[ed] a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. '347 The Court opined
that a contrary result would "open[] the door to [] full-bore legal and
evidentiary appeals . .. and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-
arbitration process.' 348
In allowing finality to trump party autonomy, however, the Court did not
overrule its prior decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.3 4 9 In
Byrd, the Court ordered arbitration of an investor's state law claims against
his broker, even though it meant that the investor's related federal claims
(which the broker assumed were not arbitrable) would have been resolved
separately in federal court. 350 The inefficiency of this result, the Court said,
was outweighed by the need to honor the parties' autonomy in agreeing to




343. Id. Section 5 provides, "If in the agreement provision be made for a method of
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be
followed; but if no method be provided therein ... the court shall designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators .... 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
344. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
345. See id. at 1406.
346. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1130; see Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
347. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405. The Court viewed the FAA's limited review provisions
as a tradeoff for the expedited treatment of awards. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1124; see Hall
St., 128 S. Ct. at 1402.
348. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
349. 470 U.S. 213 (1985); see Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405-06; Reuben, supra note 2, at
1131.
350. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
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arbitrate. 351 Thus, the Court held, when the values of efficiency and
autonomy conflict, the result should be resolved in favor of autonomy. 352
This idea could be construed to mean that the Court in Hall Street should
have honored the parties' freedom to expand the grounds for judicial review
even though the result would have been inefficient-that is, it would have
taken more time and resources to resolve the dispute. 353 However, the
value of efficiency, which the Court subordinated to party autonomy in
Byrd, and the value of finality, which the Court refused to subordinate in
Hall Street, are distinct. 354 The distinction helps explain the result in Hall
Street.
In Hall Street, finality trumped autonomy because a contrary result
would endanger the institution of arbitration itself.355 In Byrd, there was no
such danger. There, the claim of inefficiency was a generalized one; it
claimed that ordering arbitration would be inefficient for the system (that is,
the parties, courts, and arbitrators) as a whole.356 It was not a claim that the
institution of arbitration itself would be damaged by forcing the parties to
live up to their agreement to arbitrate. 357 Therefore, the result in Byrd is not
contrary to the result in Hall Street because both decisions were, in effect,
preserving the values of the arbitration process itself.358 This conclusion is
important. To the extent that Hall Street's recognition of the primacy of
finality over autonomy reflects Congress's vision of the arbitration process,
it will inform the scope of preemption of state laws that take a contrary
view.
351. See id. at 221.
352. See id.
353. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 1131-33.
354. Professor Richard C. Reuben describes the distinction: "[f]inality is about the
degree to which a decision is reviewable, while efficiency is about whether the process saves
the parties and the system time, money, and other resources .... Finality fosters efficiency,
but it is not the same as efficiency." Id. at 1131.
355. Id.; see Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008);
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 58-59 (2d ed. 2009) (arguing that
expanded review "would deprive the arbitral process of its autonomy and injure the
institution of private adjudication").
356. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1131-33.
357. The threat posed by laws that permit contractually expanded review is largely the
likelihood that expanded review provisions will become common (or even expected) in
drafting arbitration agreements, thus depriving arbitration itself of finality. See Hayford,
supra note 233, at 84-85 (noting that a legally sanctioned authorization to include expanded
review provisions "would propel large numbers of attorneys to put review provisions in
arbitration agreements, as a safe harbor in order to avoid manifold malpractice claims by
their clients who lose in arbitration"); Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 469, 509-11 (2008). Professor Stephen L. Hayford continues, "Inclusion of opt-in
provisions in arbitration agreements would virtually guarantee that, in cases of consequence,
losers will petition for vacatur, thereby robbing commercial arbitration of its finality and
making the process far more complicated, time consuming, and expensive." Hayford, supra,
at 85.
358. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1131-33. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Court
preserved the value of enforceability of arbitration agreements. In Hall Street, the Court
preserved the value of finality. See id.
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The Hall Street Court, however, was careful to limit its holding to the
FAA. In part IV of its opinion, the Court stated, "[W]e do not purport to
say that [§ § 10 and 11] exclude more searching review based on authority
outside the [FAA] as well."' 359 In doing so, the Court suggested that it did
not intend to categorically foreclose the possibility of expanded judicial
review in all circumstances. 360 The Court noted that "[t]he FAA is not the
only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards. '361
The Court then identified three non-FAA avenues that might allow parties
to obtain expanded review. 362 Those were (1) common law,363 (2) state
statutory law, 364 and (3) a court's authority to manage its cases under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.365 The Court, however, decided
nothing about the viability of these alternatives. 366 The viability of the
second alternative-state statutory law-is the subject of this Note.
Although the Court did not decide anything about the alternatives, it did
remand the case in light of them.367 The Court suggested that the third
alternative in particular-a court's authority to manage its docket-might
be available because the Hall Street parties' arbitration agreement was
entered as a court order in the course of litigation. 368 To date, however, the
lower courts have not decided this issue. Thus, barring a lower court
finding to the contrary, the expanded review provision in the Hall Street
parties' arbitration agreement is invalid.
The Court's suggestion that parties may be able to obtain expanded
review by relying on state arbitration law would be wholly empty if no
states in fact permitted such expanded review. That, however, is not
entirely the case. The next section briefly examines the availability of
expanded review under current state arbitration law regimes.
F. State Law on Vacatur
All states have their own arbitration statutes.369 Many of these statutes
are modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) or the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). 370 Both of these uniform acts are similar
359. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
360. See Reuben, supra note 2, at 1157 ("It hardly seems that the Court would have
opened the door to the state law and inherent powers approaches if the Court believed they
were preempted.").
361. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.
362. Id. at 1406-07
363. Id. at 1406.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1407.
366. Id. at 1406-07.
367. Id. at 1407-08.
368. Id. at 1406-08.
369. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1152.
370. Id.; Gross, supra note 142, at 5 & n.19; see Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few
Facts About the... Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (noting that forty-
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to the FAA in that neither one expressly authorizes parties to expand the
grounds for judicial review by contract. 37 1 Further, a number of states have
adopted Hall Street's approach when interpreting their own arbitration
statutes. 372 These states have held that their own statutes, like the FAA, do
not permit parties to expand the grounds for judicial review by contract. 373
However, a small number of states do permit parties to expand the grounds
for judicial review; two such states are New Jersey and California.374 In
New Jersey, a statute explicitly authorizes parties to expand the scope of
judicial review by contract. 375 In California, the California Supreme Court
interprets the California Arbitration Act to permit expanded review,
although the statute does not explicitly provide for it.376 California's
approach is particularly relevant because it was reaffirmed five months after
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street.377 In Cable Connection, Inc.
v. DIRECTV, Inc.,378 the California Supreme Court addressed the
preemption concerns raised by Hall Street and rejected them.379 The
California court's reasoning will be presented and analyzed in Part II. To
the extent that parties desiring expanded review of their arbitration awards
will seek to invoke the arbitration laws of these states, an understanding of
the likely preemptive scope of FAA § 10 on those state laws is critical.
This Part has discussed the background information necessary to
understand the conflict surrounding the availability of expanded review
under state arbitration law in light of Hall Street. Part II discusses the
arguments for and against the proposition that the FAA's vacatur provisions
preempt state laws that permit parties to expand the grounds for review by
contract.
nine states adopted the original UAA and providing a list of thirteen states that have adopted
the RUAA).
371. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1152; see UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) § 23 cmt. B, 7
U.L.A. 79-83 (2009); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (1956) § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 514.
372. See Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 683 S.E.2d 40, 44-
45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Pugh's Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., No. W2008-
01366-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189, at *12-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23,
2009); Quinn v. Nafta Traders, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 795, 798-99 (Tex. App. 2008).
373. See, e.g., Quinn, 257 S.W.3d at 798-99.
374. Connecticut and Rhode Island may also permit such expansion. See Garrity v.
McCaskey, 612 A.2d 742, 745 (Conn. 1992) ("When the parties agree to arbitration and
establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of
our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement.");
Bradford Dyeing Ass'n v. J. Stog Tech GmbH, 765 A.2d 1226, 1233 (R.I. 2001) (assuming,
but not deciding, that Rhode Island law permits parties to expand the grounds for judicial
review of arbitration awards by contract).
375. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4(c) (West Supp. 2009) ("[N]othing in this act shall
preclude the parties from expanding the scope of judicial review of an award by expressly
providing for such expansion in a record.").
376. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 605 (Cal. 2008).
377. See id.
378. 190 P.3d 586.
379. Id. at 597-99.
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II. DOES THE FAA PREEMPT STATE LAWS THAT PERMIT CONTRACTUALLY
EXPANDED REVIEW?
This part examines the arguments for and against the proposition that
§ 10 of the FAA, as interpreted in Hall Street, preempts state arbitration
laws that otherwise would permit parties to expand the grounds for judicial
review by contract. First, this part examines the arguments for and against
preemption when the parties have brought an action to vacate an award in
state court. In that context, it examines the conflict surrounding two issues:
(1) whether § 10 is applicable in state courts and (2) whether a state law
permitting expanded judicial review conflicts with the policies and purposes
of the FAA. Second, it addresses the preemption analysis in federal court.
Third, it addresses the effect that the parties' inclusion of a choice of
arbitration law clause will have on the analysis.
A. Preemption in State Court Proceedings
1. The Applicability of § 10 in State Court
The conflict surrounding § 10's applicability in state court generally
revolves around two issues: (1) whether the plain language of § 10 compels
the conclusion that it is only applicable in federal court and (2) whether
§ 10 is best characterized as a procedural rule from which state courts are
free, within certain limits, to deviate or as a substantive principle by which
they are bound. 380
a. The Language of§ 10
Opponents of § 10's applicability in state court argue that the plain
language of the statute prevents its application in state courts. 381 Section 10
provides that "the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration." 382  Section 10 is directed
specifically to the U.S. district court-a federal court. 383 Therefore, the
section should be inapplicable in state court proceedings. 384 Thus, state
380. As discussed in Part I, if an FAA section is applicable in state court, the parties must
comply with it, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary; thus, if § 10 applies in state
court, it will preempt state laws that permit expanded review. See supra notes 218-22 and
accompanying text.
381. Gross, supra note 142, at 31 ("[T]he precise language of section 10 strongly suggests
it applies only in federal court."); Huber, supra note 21, at 530-31 ("To even consider the
language of the statute is to doom arguments that the FAA provides the standards for judicial
review of arbitration awards in state court."); see Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,
190 P.3d 586, 597 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the language of §§ 10 and 11).
382. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
383. Huber, supra note 21, at 531.
384. Id. ("Congress did not purport to address similar review by state courts."); see Cable
Connection, 190 P.3d at 598 (stating that "'[n]othing in the legislative reports and debates
evidences a congressional intention that postaward and state court litigation rules be
preempted so long as the basic policy upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements
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courts should be free to apply state vacatur law, even if it is different from
the FAA. 385 Other sections of the FAA contain language similar to § 10,386
and the Supreme Court has failed to hold that those analogous sections are
applicable in state court.387 Moreover, Congress never intended § 10 to
apply in state court. 388
While this last point is very likely true as a historical matter, it applies
equally to all sections of the FAA-Congress never intended any of them to
apply in state court.389 Congress envisioned the FAA as a statutory scheme
applicable solely in the federal courts. 390  Congress, however, also
envisioned the FAA as a unitary statute that would apply in its entirety
when it applied at all.391 But after Southland and its progeny, the Supreme
Court abandoned Congress's vision of an exclusively federal statute by
making § 2 unquestionably applicable in state court.392 In doing so,
however, the Court failed to decide what should become of Congress's
vision of a unitary statute. That vision, according to at least one set of
commentators, could, and should, be realized.393  A Supreme Court
remained in full force and effect."' (quoting Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 726, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998))); Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc.,
2006 PA Super. 229, 66, 907 A.2d 550, 568-69.
385. See Huber, supra note 21, at 531.
386. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 597 (noting the similarities in language between
§§ 10 and 11 and §§ 3 and 4); Gross, supra note 142, at 31 (noting the similar language
between § 10 and other sections of the FAA).
387. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 & n.6 (1989) (noting that the Court has "never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their
terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court... are nonetheless applicable in
state court," but assuming for purposes of the case that those sections could be applicable in
state court); Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 597. But see Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 & n.34 (1983) (stating that "state courts, as much as
federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act" and
noting that, despite the language of § 3, "state courts have almost unanimously recognized
that the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts"); 1 MACNEIL
ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 (noting that, for practical purposes, §§ 3 and 4
apply in state court).
388. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 39, 135 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
391. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:28 (noting that "on its face the FAA is
an integrated, unitary statute dealing with arbitration" and "its words contain not a hint that
Congress intended it to be applied piecemeal"); MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 106 ("There is
thus no foundation for a belief that the A.B.A. and Congress had any intention of enacting
anything but an integrated statute, either applicable in its entirety to any given proceeding in
any given court or not at all."); see Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, & Co., 577
F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The Arbitration Act was enacted as a single, comprehensive
statutory scheme.").
392. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
393. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:34 ("The Court should take the first
opportunity to state clearly what the framers of the FAA intended: The FAA is a unitary act,
where any of it governs, all of it governs."). Some state courts have impliedly taken this
view by concluding that, without more, the full FAA should apply when an agreement
involves interstate commerce. See Lefkowitz v. HWF Holdings, LLC, No. 4381 -VCP, 2009
WL 3806299, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2009) (noting that the FAA applies to agreements
involving interstate commerce and preempts state arbitration laws unless parties clearly
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decision holding that all sections of the FAA apply in state court when
interstate commerce is involved would produce just that result and preserve
at least part of the FAA Congress intended to create. 394 An examination of
the structure of the FAA supports the notion that § 10, as part of the unitary
FAA, should apply in state court.
The structure of the FAA suggests that no individual provision was
meant to apply without the others. 395 Individual sections, when read in
isolation, appear to create an independent basis for federal courts'
jurisdiction. 396 Such readings, however, are in direct conflict with the
settled rule that the FAA does not provide such a basis for jurisdiction.397
For example, § 10, when read without reference to the rest of the FAA,
could reasonably be interpreted to mean that any party to any arbitration
agreement could seek vacatur in federal court, as long as an arbitration
award has been rendered. 398  That reading, however, is inaccurate. For
parties to seek vacatur in federal court, an independent basis for jurisdiction
is required.399 Therefore, under this line of reasoning, § 10 should not be
divorced from § 2 because § 2 provides the context for § 10's applicability,
which includes the state court context.400 A contrary conclusion would
undermine the intent of the framers of the FAA.401 Furthermore, "the very
wording" of other FAA sections supports the conclusion that the FAA was
intended to be applied as a unitary whole. 402 Thus, when § 2 applies-
intend state arbitration law to apply); WMS, Inc. v. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d 706, 710 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (concluding that because the agreement involved interstate commerce, "[t]he
FAA, therefore, controls," and making no other mention that state arbitration law might
apply); see also Allen & Co. v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (App.
Div. 1985), aff'd, 490 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1986).
394. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:34.
395. See id. § 9.3, at 9:27.
396. Id.; see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956) (rejecting
the argument that § 3 of the FAA covers all arbitration agreements, even those that do not
involve interstate commerce).
397. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
398. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:27 & n.5.
399. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
400. See MACNEIL, supra note 26, at 106 (arguing that "any idea that section 2 is
somehow independent of the remaining sections, that it creates its own system of
independent regulation separate from the remaining sections is a historical absurdity").
Professor Macneil bases his argument for a unitary FAA largely on his conclusion that the
FAA was never intended to apply at all in state court and that, therefore, when it was
applicable in federal court (because of the presence of interstate commerce) it would apply in
its entirety. See id. at 106-07. Nonetheless, he advocates for the unitary approach, even in
state court. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76-:81 (setting out
arguments in favor of FAA preemption of all state law).
401. See Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, & Co., 577 F.2d 264, 268-69 (5th
Cir. 1978); see also Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 359 F. Supp. 261,
263 (D.D.C. 1973) (acknowledging that the FAA was enacted as a unitary statute); S. REP.
No. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (suggesting the unitary applicability of the FAA by noting that § 1
defines the contracts "to which the bill will apply"). But see Drahozal, supra note 135, at
168-69 (arguing that a narrower approach to FAA preemption would be consistent with the
framers' intent).
402. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 9.3, at 9:28 (offering an example of how § 9
would have been written if it were "intended to stand alone").
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whether in state court or federal-§ 10, and its prohibition on expanded
review, should also apply. This would give effect to the FAA's role as a
"single, comprehensive statutory scheme." 40 3
However, this is not precisely the path courts have taken. After
Southland, courts have divided FAA provisions into two categories:
substantive provisions, which govern in state court, and procedural
provisions, which, unless their application undermines the policies of the
FAA, do not.4 04 The next section examines the debate over § 10's place in
that dichotomy.
b. Section 10: Procedural or Substantive?
The terms "substantive" and "procedural" can mean different things in
different contexts. 405 In the context of the FAA, the distinction divides
provisions that apply in state court from those that do not. The distinction,
however, is not without some murkiness.406 Substantive FAA provisions
govern in state court directly.40 7 Procedural FAA provisions do not govern
in state court at all, unless application of an analogous state procedural
provision would undermine the policies of the FAA. 4 08 While there is no
authoritative definition of either term in the context of the FAA, they can
generally be categorized as follows. A substantive provision of the FAA is
one that "create[s], define[s] and regulate[s] rights." 409  A procedural
provision is one that "prescribe[s] the manner in which arbitration is to be
conducted. '410 The murkiness arises when the FAA's core substantive
403. Commercial Metals, 577 F.2d at 268.
404. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 597 (Cal. 2008);
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Kaminsky,
supra note 270, at 528 (noting the difficulty of applying Volt because of the distinction
between "substantive" and "procedural" provisions).
405. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
406. See infra note 411 and accompanying text.
407. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (noting that the FAA "calls for the
application, in state as well as federal courts, of federal substantive law regarding
arbitration").
408. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 977 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Ariz. 1999)
("Each state is free to apply its own procedural requirements so long as those procedures do
not defeat the purposes of the act."); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 627
(Md. 2001) (noting that state "procedural rules govern appeals, unless those rules undermine
the goals and principles of the FAA").
409. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d at 795 (applying the FAA's vacatur provisions as substantive
federal law). Substantive FAA provisions may also be described as those whose application
is "outcome determinative" in the sense that if they are not applied, state law will not require
arbitration. Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect upon
the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 35,
62-63 (1997).
410. Diamond, supra note 409, at 61. Professor Diamond offers the following examples
of procedural provisions: "[r]ules concerning the process for compelling or commencing
arbitration, selection of the arbitrators, the scope of discovery, the manner in which the
hearing is conducted, and the process for confirming an award .... Id. at 61-62 (footnotes
omitted). Although his mention of "the process for confirming an award" seems to implicate
the grounds for vacatur in § 10, he describes this element in terms of when a timely motion
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provision-§ 2-cannot be given effect without applying other provisions
that fit the description of procedural provisions.41' Thus, on the question
whether § 10 is a substantive provision applicable in state court or a
procedural provision that is not, the answer, at its core, will turn largely on
§ 10's relationship to § 2 in light of Hall Street.
The argument that § 10 is a procedural provision that should not apply in
state court rests on the assertion that the law of vacatur "does not challenge
the determination that the parties had an enforceable arbitration
agreement. '412 The application of vacatur provisions does not somehow
render an arbitration agreement invalid.413  Instead, "[v]acatur law
prescribes the very narrow grounds on which a court will second-guess the
arbitrators' decision."4 14  Thus, application of § 10 in state court is not
necessary to give effect to § 2's substantive command that arbitration
agreements be enforced.415 The two sections, moreover, address different
questions. Section 2 asks whether the parties, having agreed to arbitrate,
should be required to do so. Section 10, on the other hand, asks whether
parties, having already arbitrated, should be permitted to have the court set
aside an arbitrators' award. A positive response to the second question in
no way affects the answer to the first question.416 Therefore, unless
application of a state vacatur provision undermines the policies of the FAA,
state courts should be free to apply state vacatur law, including state vacatur
law that permits contractually expanded review.417
One may argue, however, that the above conclusion-that § 10's vacatur
provisions do not affect the command of § 2-is not categorically
must be made to seek vacatur, not in terms of the grounds upon which a court may vacate the
award. See id. at 62 & n.223.
411. This situation implicates the applicability of FAA sections based on "emanations"
from § 2. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
412. Gross, supra note 142, at 32; see also Ati. Painting & Contracting, Inc. v. Nashville
Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 846-47 (Ky. 1984) ("The federal Arbitration Act covers both
substantive law and a procedure for federal courts to follow where a party to arbitration
seeks to enforce or vacate an arbitration award in federal court. The procedural aspects are
confined to federal cases.").
413. Gross, supra note 142, at 32; see Strausbaugh v. H & R Block Fin. Advisors, Inc.,
No. 2005-CA-001083-MR, 2007 WL 3122257, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2007)
(characterizing vacatur provisions as procedural because "while [they] may affect the
enforcement of an arbitration award, [they] in no way impact[] the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement").
414. Gross, supra note 142, at 32.
415. See id. ("Because vacatur is a courtroom procedure providing for limited judicial
review of the arbitration process, preemption of rules limiting the enforcement and
interpretation of a contract is inapposite." (citing Diamond, supra note 409, at 61-62)); see
also Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 2006 PA Super. 229, 63, 907 A.2d
550, 568 (arguing that vacatur provisions are procedural and that they apply only "after the
underlying arbitration agreement already has been enforced in accordance with the FAA").
416. See Gross, supra note 142, at 32.
417. Huber, supra note 2 1, at 536 (arguing that "individual states may choose to adopt a
different approach to contractual provisions regarding judicial review than that taken in the
FAA (as interpreted by the Supreme Court [in Hall Street])").
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accurate.418 One purpose of vacatur laws is to ensure that the arbitration
process is brought to a conclusion. 419 To effectively accomplish that goal,
vacatur laws should be narrow enough to avoid providing parties with "a
vehicle for easily escaping the arbitration bargain. '420  Vacatur laws
achieve this goal by carefully defining the allocation of power between
courts and arbitrators. 421  In doing so, vacatur laws provide a "clear
parallel" to laws-like § 2-relating to the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate because they both define the "role of the judiciary in holding
parties to [arbitration] agreements." 422 Laws that limit the arbitrability of
claims shift authority away from arbitrators and into courts; similarly, laws
that permit broad or "far reaching" 423 judicial review of awards achieve the
same result-that is, arbitrators are denied "the power to resolve a particular
dispute or grant a particular remedy." 424 Thus, laws that prevent this result
are best characterized as substantive because they serve to ensure the
"effectuation" of the arbitration process, both in its commencement and in
its culmination.425 Section 10 plays precisely this role and, according to
this line of reasoning, should apply in state court as a substantive piece of
federal arbitration law.4 26
The above argument, however, fails to consider that a state law
authorizing expanded review is not the same as a state law generally
providing for broader review than the FAA in all situations. The second
418. See Gross, supra note 142, at 32 (arguing that a vacatur law should be characterized
as substantive-and thus affecting § 2 rights--only where it authorized broad review of an
award).
419. Hayford, supra note 233, at 81.
420. Id.
421. Gross, supra note 142, at 32; see Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc.,
7 F. App'x 784, 787 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that vacatur law "affects the allocation of
authority between courts and arbitrators"); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d
788, 794-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
422. Hayford, supra note 233, at 75.
423. Id. at 81.
424. Diamond, supra note 409, at 62.
425. Hayford, supra note 233, at 75 (arguing that vacatur "concem[s] effectuation of the
result of the arbitration process and thereby serve[s] to effectively culminate enforcement of
contractual agreements to arbitrate"); see Cullinan, supra note 230, at 416 (connecting the
concept of the scope of judicial review of awards to the concept of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements and concluding that the FAA "should prevent state law expansion of
the courts' role in judicial review, because displacing finality undermines the FAA's
command of enforcement" (citing Zhaodong Jiang, Note, Federal Arbitration Law and State
Court Proceedings, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 473, 527-28 (1990))).
426. See Rau, supra note 357, at 503-04 (describing a court's obligation to confirm an
award as "a matter of federal substantive arbitration policy"); see also DCR Constr., Inc. v.
Delta-T Corp., No. 8.09-CV-741-T-27AEP, 2009 WL 5173520, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30,
2009) ("To the extent the award is not vacated, modified, or corrected, the FAA provides
parties with a substantive right to a judgment confirming the award."). At least one scholar
argues that while the standard for judicial review of an arbitration award is substantive, that
characterization serves to justify application of state law standards of review in federal court
because of Erie principles. See John J. Barcel6 III, Expanded Judicial Review of Awards
After Hall Street and in Comparative Perspective, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
LIBER AMICORUM TIBOR VARADY 1, 14-15 (Peter Hay et al. eds., 2009). This argument is
criticized in Part III. See infra notes 519-20 and accompanying text.
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type of law "would clearly be preempted;" the first, one commentator
argues, would not.427 He argues that a state law provision permitting
expanded review "is not, in the relevant sense, a state law ground for
vacating an arbitration award. Rather, it is the parties' ground for vacating
an arbitration award. '428  Therefore, it should not be preempted. His
argument, however, rests on an interpretation of § 10 that, after Hall Street,
is no longer valid-that is, that § 10 is a default provision around which
parties are free to contract. 429  Hall Street unequivocally rejected the
argument that the FAA's grounds for review are default provisions alterable
by contract. 430 The commentator's argument therefore fails. Moreover, a
wide variety of other commentators argue, often without much analysis,
that the FAA's grounds for review preempt different state law grounds. 431
The foregoing discussion of § 10's applicability in state court implicates
a related piece of the preemption analysis-that is, whether application of a
state law permitting expanded review would undermine the policies of the
FAA. If it would, then FAA § 10 will preempt the competing state law
even if § 10 is not directly applicable in state courts.432
2. Section 10 and the Policies of the FAA
a. Expanded Review Does Not Undermine the Policies of the FAA
The primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms. 433 Specifically, the FAA
embodied Congress's intent to address judicial hostility toward executory
arbitration agreements.434  Therefore, one may argue that a state law
427. Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In "for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263, 270 (1997).
428. Id.
429. See id. (arguing that the "notion" that state laws providing for contractually
expanded review are preempted "rests on the view that the federal grounds for vacating are a
mandatory rule, i.e., the parties may not, by contract, add additional grounds").
430. See supra Part I.E.
431. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 355, at 58 (arguing, post-Hall Street, that "[i]f a form
of review is unacceptable under the federal law, it should likewise be unavailable under state
statutory regimes"); 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 ("[A] state court
vacating an award on grounds other than those allowed under the FAA would be violating
the principles of Perry v. Thomas .. "); WARE, supra note 219, § 2.46, at 125 ("Federal law
preempts state grounds for vacatur not found in federal law."); Ware, supra note 427, at 270
("[S]tate law may not vacate arbitration awards on grounds not recognized by federal law.");
cf Gross, supra note 142, at 31 ("The FAA preemption doctrine could possibly preclude
application of that state's vacatur law only if that law provides grounds broader than those
allowed under the FAA."). Additionally, the drafters of the RUAA, after significant debate,
decided not to include a provision authorizing parties to contract for expanded review
because of the high likelihood of preemption of such a law. See Hayford, supra note 233, at
84-86.
432. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
433. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
434. See id.; Huber, supra note 21, at 524 ("The FAA addresses only a single substantive
problem: judicial hostility to executory arbitration agreements."); supra Part I.A.
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permitting enforcement of an agreed-upon term in the arbitration agreement
does not contravene the FAA's purpose.435 In fact, such a state law
preserves the parties' autonomy to shape the contours of their own dispute
resolution process. 436 Even though the appropriateness of such a law is
open for debate, the existence of such a debate does not render a law that
permits parties to contract for broad standards of review "hostile" to
arbitration.437 At most, such a law permits parties to invoke an arbitral
feature about whose value reasonable people may disagree. 438
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on FAA preemption
supports the conclusion that state laws are preempted only when they
conflict with a term of the parties' arbitration agreement. 439 In the case of a
state law permitting parties to contract for expanded review, however, the
parties' agreement and the state law are in harmony.440 The state law does
not negate a term of the parties' agreement. 441 Therefore, it does not
contravene the policy of FAA § 2 that arbitration agreements must be
enforced.442
The disposition in Hall Street also supports this conclusion.443 If the
Court had meant to announce a mandatory, nationwide policy prohibiting
contractually expanded review, then (1) it would not have suggested that
other avenues for expanded review might be available, 444 and (2) it would
435. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 598-99 (Cal. 2008);
Huber, supra note 21, at 530; see Reuben, supra note 2, at 1160; see also Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1409 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
refusing to enforce expanded review provisions "defeats the primary purpose of the
[FAA]").
436. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
437. Huber, supra note 21, at 530.
438. See id.; see also Ware, supra note 427, at 270 (arguing that a state law permitting
contractual expansion of the grounds for review should not be preempted by the FAA
because such a law merely permits the parties to contract for review; it does not require
courts to conduct broad review of awards where the parties have not agreed to it).
439. See Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (holding that statutes that "lodg[e]
primary jurisdiction" in an administrative forum, despite an agreement to arbitrate, are
preempted); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 491 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Professor
Christopher R. Drahozal describes the idea that state laws are preempted only when they
conflict with a provision of the arbitration agreement as the "Pro-Contract Theory" of
preemption. See Drahozal, supra note 57, at 419.
440. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1160 ("[T]he state law authorizing judicial review would be
reinforcing a term in the contract rather than interfering with it.").
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008);
Huber, supra note 21, at 536; Reuben, supra note 2, at 1160 (suggesting that Hall Street
"tends to show that FAA preemption is narrower than many have perceived"). But see Rau,
supra note 357, at 503-04 (suggesting that Hall Street turned § 10 from a procedural
provision, "manipulable by party agreement," into a mandatory rule of federal substantive
policy).
444. See Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 599; Huber, supra note 21, at 536 ("[T]he
Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the FAA and observed that different
approaches to judicial review of arbitration awards might be adopted under state arbitration
law."); Reuben, supra note 2, at 1157 ("It hardly seems that the Court would have opened
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not have remanded the case for consideration by the lower courts on that
very issue.445 The Court's statements on the availability of non-FAA
avenues for review, however, were dicta.446 The Court did not address, or
even mention, the possibility that its interpretation of §§ 9 and 10 may
preempt contrary state laws when those state laws are analyzed under the
principles of Southland and its progeny.447 Thus, the Court's reference to
state arbitration law as a potential source for obtaining expanded review
should not be dispositive.448
b. Expanded Review Undermines the Policies of the FAA
A state law is preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 449 In the context of the FAA, the "full purposes and objectives
of Congress" '450 include more than the FAA's "primary purpose" 451 of
making agreements to arbitrate enforceable. 452 Congress envisioned an
arbitral process characterized by speed, efficiency, and finality.453 These
"process characteristics and values," 454 therefore, form a basis for
preemption of contrary state law.455 Thus, a state law that permits what the
FAA forbids-that is, expanded review by private contract-is a contrary
state law subject to preemption. 456 Such a law undermines not only the
exclusive command of § 10, but also the enforceability command of § 2
the door to the state law and inherent powers approaches if the Court believed they were
preempted.").
445. Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 599.
446. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008)
(acknowledging that the Court was "deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards"); Reuben, supra note 2, at 1150-5 1.
447. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 355, at 58 (noting that Hall Street's suggestion that
expanded review might be available under state law "does not account for the federal
preemption doctrine").
448. See id. (arguing that state laws that permit expanded review should be preempted
and that Hall Street's reference to state law as a potential source of expanded review is
"peculiar, if not incomprehensible").
449. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501,
533 (1912)).
450. Id.
451. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989).
452. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:90 n. 112; Reuben, supra note
2, at 1132; supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA's component
policies).
453. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (characterizing the FAA as intending to
"reduc[e] technicality, delay, and expense to a minimum"); Reuben, supra note 2, at 1132;
supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
454. Reuben, supra note 2, at 1132-33.
455. See M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141-42
(D.R.I. 1999) (finding a state law ground for vacatur preempted because it provided less
protection for enforcement of the arbitration award than the FAA); Cullinan, supra note 230,
at 416.
456. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 355, at 58-59; 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29,
§ 10.8.3.2, at 10:97.
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because "displacing finality undermines the FAA's command of
enforcement. '457
B. Preemption in Federal Court
In federal court, all sections of the FAA apply by their terms.458
Therefore, unless the parties have expressly agreed that state law will apply,
§ 10 should govern any proceeding in federal court notwithstanding any
different state vacatur law.4 59 However, a number of federal courts have
taken a slightly different approach.460 These cases have held that state
vacatur law may be applied in federal court, even where the parties have not
agreed to its application, as long as the state law "does not limit a party's
ability to enforce an arbitration award. '461
In M & L Power Services, Inc. v. American Networks International,462
for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
reasoned that one of Rhode Island's state law grounds for vacatur limited a
party's ability to enforce an award. 463 Therefore, the court concluded that
the Rhode Island law "violates Congress' policy as set forth in the FAA."464
"As such," the court continued, "it is preempted and may not be applied to
any case to which the FAA applies-whether in federal or state court. 465
Thus, the court applied FAA § 10. However, its reasoning suggests that
had the Rhode Island law not undermined the policies of the FAA, the court
457. Cullinan, supra note 230, at 416 (citing Jiang, supra note 425, at 527-28); see
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We would reach an
illogical result if we concluded that the FAA's policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements is well served by allowing for expansive judicial review after the
matter is arbitrated."); CARBONNEAU, supra note 355, at 58-59 (arguing that a state law
permitting expanded review "would deprive the arbitral process of its autonomy and injure
the institution of private adjudication"); David W. Rivkin & Eric P. Tuchmann, Protecting
Both the FAA and Party Autonomy: The Hall Street Decision, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 537,
540 (2008) ("[P]ermitting private parties to determine the scope of a court's legal and factual
review of an arbitral decision would have undermined the goals of the FAA and the effective
functioning of the arbitration process.").
458. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:80-:81 (noting that "[i]n federal
courts, all the sections of the comprehensive FAA will govern" and "the FAA is never only
partially applicable in federal courts"); see 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 10 (2006) (referring to federal
courts).
459. See Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2004);
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) ("[B]ecause Congress has specified standards for confirming an arbitration award,
federal courts must act pursuant to those standards and no others."); 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra
note 29, § 10.8.1.3, at 10:73 ("Absent . . . party choice of state arbitration law, state
arbitration law cannot, even in theory, limit or obstruct an explicit FAA provision.").
460. See Penn Va. Oil & Gas Corp. v. CNX Gas Co., No. 1:06cv00090, 2007 WL
593578, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:06cv00090, 2007 WL 805891 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007); M & L, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
461. M&L, 44 F. Supp. 2dat 141;see Penn Va., 2007 WL 593578, at *6.
462. 44 F. Supp. 2d 134.






would have applied it, even though the case was in federal court and even
though the parties had not agreed to apply Rhode Island arbitration law.4 66
This line of reasoning is unlikely to affect the application of Hall Street
in cases where the parties are in federal court and where they have not
specified that state arbitration law will apply.467 In those cases, a federal
court would likely find that a state arbitration law permitting expanded
review was preempted because it would "limit a party's ability to enforce an
arbitration award. '468 However, the reasoning is nonetheless significant
because of the implications it has for the preemptive effect of § 10 in cases
where parties have clearly expressed their desire to arbitrate according to
state law. The M & L court, for instance, concluded that Rhode Island's
"'complete irrationality' doctrine cannot be imported into commercial
arbitrations to which the FAA applies. ' 469 The court already concluded that
the Rhode Island law undermined the policies of the FAA 470 and, with the
sentence quoted above, seemed to suggest that the result would have been
the same even if the parties had agreed to apply Rhode Island arbitration
law. 471 If that were indeed the court's message, a state law permitting
expanded review would likewise be preempted, despite a choice of
arbitration law clause to the contrary.472 The reasoning of an analogous
federal court case, Penn Virginia Oil & Gas Corp. v. CNX Gas Co., 4 7 3 is
addressed in the next section, which deals in more detail with the effect of a
choice of arbitration law clause on the analysis.
C. Effect of a Choice ofArbitration Law Clause474
Where the parties have included a clause that expresses their clear intent
to arbitrate according to state law, the preemption analysis is different. In
such a situation, courts-both state and federal475-should enforce the
466. See id. at 137 (noting that the parties disagreed about whether state law or the FAA
would apply and addressing the question in terms of whether the state law would conflict
with the FAA).
467. Cf 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:80-:81 (acknowledging that
all sections of the FAA apply in federal court).
468. M & L, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 141; see Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,
935-37 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that parties may not contract for expanded review under
the FAA because allowing them to do so would undermine the policies of the FAA).
469. M & L, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
470. Id.
471. See id. at 137 (failing to acknowledge an exception to preemption if parties agree to
apply Rhode Island arbitration law).
472. Cf supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text (noting that a state law may still be
preempted even when the parties agree to it if the state law undermines the policies of the
FAA).
473. No. 1:06cv00090, 2007 WL 593578, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2007), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:06cv00090, 2007 WL 805891 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007).
474. This section will assume that the parties have clearly expressed their intent that state
arbitration law would apply to their agreement so that any court-either state or federal-
would be willing to recognize that the parties intended state arbitration law to apply.
475. The effect of a choice of arbitration law clause should be the same in federal court as
in state court. Huber, supra note 21, at 514 ("That choice of law is controlling in any federal
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chosen state's arbitration laws, even if those laws otherwise would be
preempted by the FAA.476 Hall Street, however, may have added a wrinkle
to the analysis. Hall Street turned § 10 from a default provision alterable by
contract into a mandatory rule of federal law.477 It announced that federal
law-in the form of the FAA-prohibits parties from expanding the
grounds for judicial review by private contract.478 In doing so, it raised the
question whether agreements to arbitrate under state law-including those
state laws that permit expanded review-are now nothing more than the
functional equivalent of the precise maneuver Hall Street forbids-that is, a
private agreement to expand the scope of judicial review.479 The conflict
surrounding this issue turns largely on the meaning of Volt. Specifically, it
turns on the proper role of the FAA in cases where parties have agreed to
arbitrate according to state law. This section examines three interpretations
of Volt's impact on that issue and the subtle, but important, consequences of
each interpretation.
Professor Ian R. Macneil and his coauthors argue that, in Volt, the Court
treated the FAA as "at most, a kind of umbrella." 480 They argue that the
Volt Court assumed that it was dealing with a situation where the FAA did
not apply at all,481 except as a foundational safeguard against the
or state court."); see Drahozal, supra note 57, at 407-08 (arguing that a state law is not
preempted if the parties agree that it will apply and making no distinction on this point
whether the parties are in state or federal court); see also Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty Ltd. v.
Super Prods. Corp., 874 F. Supp. 247, 248-49 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (honoring the parties'
agreement to arbitrate according to state law), affd, 86 F.3d 96 (7th Cir. 1996); Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 240 Cal. Rptr. 558, 560 (Ct. App.
1987) (honoring a choice to arbitrate according to state law), affd, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
476. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. at 485
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that a choice to arbitrate according to state law
"would permit a state rule, otherwise preempted by the FAA, to govern [the] arbitration");
see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (noting that
contractual intent can permit application of a state rule that would otherwise be preempted);
Drahozal, supra note 57, at 411.
477. Rau, supra note 357, at 503-04; see Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008) (holding that the FAA grounds for review are exclusive and cannot be
modified by private contract); cf Ware, supra note 427, at 270 (describing default rules and
mandatory rules).
478. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
479. See McQueen-Starling v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[I]t is difficult to see how a contractual agreement by the parties to apply
a state law standard of review could change the analysis, because contracting around the
FAA is precisely the maneuver prohibited by Hall Street ...."); Robert Ellis, Imperfect
Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1187, 1191, 1194-95 (2009) (noting that Hall Street left open the
question of whether avenues outside the FAA are viable for obtaining expanded review);
Smit, supra note 11, at 521 (describing the possibility of contracting for review under state
law and concluding that "[i]t is hard to accept that the Supreme Court would sanction such a
blatant attempt to circumvent its ruling").
480. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.3, at 10:85.
481. To achieve the result of complete FAA inapplicability, scholars and courts suggest
that parties expressly provide for such an exclusion. See L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P. v.
Omega Builders, Inc. (In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P.), 9 S.W.3d 125, 127-28 (Tex.
1999) ("The choice-of-law provision did not specifically exclude the application of federal
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application of a body of state arbitration law that, as a whole, was hostile to
arbitration. 482 Under this "umbrella" approach, the Volt Court upheld the
application of the particular California provision not because the provision
was, in itself, consistent with the policies of the FAA, but because it was
part of a body of arbitration law that, as a whole, was not hostile to
arbitration.483 The same approach can be used to justify application of a
state law that permits expanded review. As long as the parties have
expressly agreed to be governed by state arbitration law, and as long as the
body of state arbitration is not, as a whole, hostile to arbitration, then the
agreement should be enforced because it rests comfortably under the FAA's
"umbrella."484
Professor Macneil and his coauthors criticize the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Casarotto that the umbrella approach may not be wholly
accurate. 485 In Casarotto, the Court implied that a particular Montana
notice requirement provision would have been preempted even if the parties
had agreed to apply Montana arbitration law.486 This implication, Professor
Macneil and his coauthors argue, is unsound. 487 Arbitration is a creature of
contract, and broad recognition should be given to the parties' contractual
choices, unless the parties' choice of state law falls outside the broad
"umbrella" articulated in Volt.488 Under this approach, a clearly expressed
choice to be governed by state arbitration law permitting expanded review
should be honored where the parties have provided for such review.
The "umbrella" approach, however, has not been applied neatly. At least
one court has articulated the meaning of Volt in a way that, in light of Hall
law, and absent such an exclusion we decline to read the choice-of-law clause as having such
an effect." (footnote omitted)); In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc., No. 05-09-00101-CV,
2009 WL 3353622, at *10 (Tex. App. Oct. 20, 2009) (stating that a choice of law provision
will not make the FAA inapplicable "unless the clause specifically excludes the application
of federal law"); Drahozal, supra note 57, at 412 & n.149 (noting the importance of
including language that expressly excludes application of federal law); Rau, supra note 357,
at 504 ("At most, what is left to contracting parties in the future is an express exclusion of
the FAA in favor of some state arbitration regime ... ").
482. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.8.2.3, at 10:85; see also Hackett v. Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N.Y. 1995) (giving full effect to the parties'
choice of state arbitration law without mentioning the possibility that the state laws might
nonetheless be preempted if they conflicted with the purposes of the FAA).
483. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:115; see also Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 & n.5 (1989)
(suggesting that the body of California arbitration law as a whole is not hostile to
arbitration).
484. Interestingly, both California arbitration law, as a whole, and New Jersey arbitration
law, as a whole, have been criticized in this regard. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29,
§ 10.9.1, at 10:107 n.10 (arguing that if the Volt Court had taken a more in-depth look at
California arbitration law as a whole, "the Court might conceivably have reached a different
conclusion" because the California law "regulates arbitration law considerably more than
does the FAA"); Rau, supra note 357, at 504 n. 112 (criticizing New Jersey's laws).
485. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:115-: 16.
486. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
487. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:116.
488. See id.
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Street, threatens to undermine parties' ability to use clear choice of
arbitration law provisions to obtain expanded judicial review. In Flight
Systems, Inc. v. Paul A. Laurence Co., 4 89 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia concluded that the parties agreed to arbitrate according
to Virginia law, including its vacatur provisions.490  In reaching its
conclusion, the court described Volt's principle as follows: that courts
should "enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate in accordance
with their terms as long as those terms are consistent with the goals of the
FAA."'491 The court then compared Virginia's vacatur provisions to FAA
§ 10 and concluded that the Virginia provisions did not "directly conflict
with the goals of the FAA. '492 Thus, the court applied Virginia's vacatur
law.4 93 However, it did so not because Virginia arbitration law, as a whole,
fell under the FAA's "umbrella," but because Virginia's vacatur law in
particular did not conflict with the FAA's vacatur law.494 After Hall Street,
this approach would result in preemption.495 Any direct comparison of
FAA § 10 to a state law that permits contractually expanded review would
likely result in a finding that the two are in unmistakable conflict. In that
situation, FAA § 10 would govern, despite the parties' choice of state
arbitration law.
The reasoning in Penn Virginia is similar. Although that case did not
involve a contractual choice to arbitrate according to state law,496 its
reasoning is important nonetheless. Like the Flight Systems court, the Penn
Virginia court applied state vacatur law because it found that the state
vacatur laws did not conflict with FAA § 10.4 9 7 However, the court also
reasoned that, even though the FAA applied in the sense that the agreement
involved interstate commerce, it only governed the actual arbitration, not
the postarbitration confirmation proceedings in court.498 Applying the logic
of Flight Systems and Penn Virginia to an agreement providing for both
expanded review and arbitration according to permissive state law yields
489. 715 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
490. Id. at 1127-28.
491. Id. at 1127.
492. Id. at 1127 & n.3.
493. Id. at 1127-28.
494. See id.; 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 29, § 10.9.2.2, at 10:117 (noting that the Flight
Systems, Inc. v. Paul A. Laurence Co. court reached its conclusion by comparing the
Virginia vacatur provisions to the FAA vacatur provisions).
495. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 355, at 58 ("If a form of review is unacceptable under
the federal law, it should likewise be unavailable under state statutory regimes.").
496. See Penn Va. Oil & Gas Corp. v. CNX Gas Co., No. 1:06cv00090, 2007 WL
593578, at *5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2007) (noting that the parties' agreement did not specify
what arbitration law was to be applied), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:06cv00090, 2007 WL 805891 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007).
497. Id. at *6. Though the comparison of the specific state vacatur law to FAA § 10
provided the primary grounds for the court's decision, the court also suggested that it was, at
least to some extent, applying the "umbrella" approach. See id. ("I also find that there is
nothing contained in the VUAA that hinders the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate.").
498. See id. at *5.
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two important propositions. The first is that a choice of arbitration law
clause might be read to incorporate only state laws that govern the
arbitration proceeding itself and not state law provisions on vacatur. 499
This possibility leaves courts free to apply § 10 to defeat an expanded
review provision, despite the parties' choice of permissive state law. 50 0 It
also, however, arguably leaves state courts free to apply state vacatur law
even when the parties have agreed that the FAA will apply. The Cable
Connection court used precisely this approach to justify applying
California's vacatur law, even though the parties agreed that the FAA
would apply.501
The second proposition is that, in applying Volt to determine the validity
of a choice to arbitrate according to state laws that permit expanded review,
courts may frame the issue as whether the state vacatur laws in particular,
rather than the body of state arbitration law as a whole, conflict with FAA
§ 10.502 Framed in that light, the state and federal laws surely conflict.
Thus the state law would be preempted, despite the parties' clearly
expressed choice to be governed by it.50 3
Another, more nuanced, reading of Volt may result in the same outcome.
In Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser,504 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reasoned that agreements containing choice of
499. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (arguing that parties lack the authority to shape postaward proceedings
in court); Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 457, at 538 (noting that parties' freedom is
limited to the arbitration itself).
500. It also arguably opens the door for courts to enforce what Professor Stephen K.
Huber calls a "Mix and Match" approach. See Huber, supra note 21, at 543. If courts are
willing to read choice of arbitration law clauses as incorporating only a portion of the chosen
body of arbitration law, then parties could conceivably incorporate only the state law on
vacatur while agreeing that all other aspects of their arbitration agreement would be
governed by the FAA. See id. at 544 ("In view of the central place of freedom of contract in
the arbitration jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, a reasonably clear 'pick and choose'
approach is likely to be upheld by federal as well as state courts."). Such an approach would
allow parties to avoid the "unanticipated peculiarities of state law." Id. at 543.
501. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 597 n.12 (Cal. 2008).
The parties' agreement contained the following provision: "any arbitration conducted
hereunder shall be governed by the United States Arbitration Act [FAA] (9 U.S.C. Section 1,
et seq.)." Id. at 590 n.3. The court reasoned that because the parties did not specifically
provide that the FAA's vacatur provisions would apply, and because the parties proceeded in
state court as if state law applied, the California vacatur law should govern. Id. at 597 n. 12.
502. See Penn Va. Oil & Gas Corp. v. CNX Gas Co., No. 1:06cv00090, 2007 WL
593578, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:06cv00090, 2007 WL 805891 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007); Flight Sys., Inc. v. Paul A.
Laurence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125, 1127-28 (D.D.C. 1989).
503. See Louis Smith, Grounds for Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards in the FAA Are
Exclusive: Supreme Court Leaves Open Possibility for Review of a Different Scope Under
State Law, 192 N.J. L.J. 566, 566 (2008) (discussing Hall Street and acknowledging that
parties "may expressly opt out of the FAA" but nonetheless noting that "statutes like those in
New Jersey may ultimately be found to be pre-empted by the FAA").
504. 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
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arbitration law clauses do not "cease being subject to the FAA. '505 Instead,
choice of arbitration law clauses allow parties to specify the rules for
arbitration, as the FAA permits them to do.506 When the parties agree that
state arbitration law will apply, the FAA gives the choice of law term in
their agreement the force of federal law, and courts are thus required to
enforce it.50 7 Thus, when a court enforces such an agreement, it enforces
the state arbitration laws not as laws in themselves, but as provisions of the
parties' agreement. 50 8 The court does this because, as a matter of federal
law, it is required to do so.509 However, after Hall Street, courts must
contend with another command of federal law-that is, that parties should
not be permitted to supplement by contract the FAA's grounds for
review.510 Thus, the result is a conflict between two important commands
of federal arbitration law. The resolution of this conflict should turn largely
on a balancing of the FAA's underlying policies.
The above part presented and analyzed the arguments for and against the
proposition that § 10, as interpreted in Hall Street, preempts state laws that
permit contractually expanded review. The next part argues that unless the
parties have expressly agreed that permissive state arbitration law will
apply, § 10 should preempt state laws that otherwise would permit
contractually expanded review.
III. STATE LAWS PERMITTING CONTRACTUALLY EXPANDED REVIEW
SHOULD BE PREEMPTED, WITH ONE EXCEPTION
This part argues that FAA § 10, as interpreted in Hall Street, preempts
state laws that permit parties to contractually expand the grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards. However, it also argues that such
state laws should not be preempted if the parties expressly agree that the
entire body of that state's arbitration law will apply to the complete
exclusion of the FAA. It argues that the result should be the same in federal
and state court.
First, this part addresses the preemption analysis in both federal and state
courts where the parties have not clearly agreed that state arbitration law
will apply. In the federal court context, it criticizes the approach taken by
some federal courts whereby those courts apply (or even consider applying)
state vacatur law instead of § 10. Such an approach is inconsistent with
both the plain language of the statute and the intent of its framers. In the
505. Id. at 292.
506. Id.
507. Ware, supra note 294, at 554 ("The FAA is special because its core provision,
Section 2, gives the terms of arbitration agreements the force of federal law."); see Roadway,
257 F.3d at 292.
508. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 292 ("When a court enforces the terms of an arbitration
agreement that incorporates state law rules, it does so not because the parties have chosen to
be governed by state rather than federal law. Rather, it does so because federal law requires
that the court enforce the terms of the agreement.").
509. Id.; see Ware, supra note 294, at 554.
510. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2008).
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state court context, this part argues that, in light of Hall Street, § 10 should
apply in state court as an "emanation" from § 2's substantive command of
enforceability.
Second, this part examines the circumstances under which parties may
circumvent Hall Street's prohibition on contractually expanded review. In
that context, it argues that courts, in determining whether to enforce an
expanded review provision, should apply a bright-line test. The test should
require parties wanting expanded review to (1) provide for an expanded
ground for review; (2) expressly provide that state arbitration law
permitting expanded review will apply; and (3) expressly provide that the
FAA will not apply. This approach effectively preserves the finality of the
arbitration process as articulated in Hall Street. At the same time, it also
recognizes a place for party autonomy in shaping the level of review of
arbitration awards.
A. Preemption in Federal Court
In federal court, FAA § 10 should apply without discussion. 511 The plain
language of the statute requires it.512 Contrary approaches-like those in M
& L513 and Penn Virginia514 -are unnecessary and unwise. Both of those
cases permitted parties to litigate issues that were ambiguous at best, when
such litigation was unnecessary. Surely the framers of the FAA did not
intend to open the door for parties to litigate the issue of their nebulous,
unarticulated intent in the face of a statute that tells the federal court exactly
what to do. Moreover, such an approach encourages the losing party to an
arbitration agreement containing an expanded review provision (which
otherwise would be invalid in federal court under Hall Street) to litigate any
colorable basis for claiming that the parties intended more accommodating
state vacatur law to apply. This result, again, is inimical to the policies of
the FAA.515 It does nothing more than "breed[] litigation from a statute that
seeks to avoid it.' '516
Perhaps the reasoning of M & L and Penn Virginia can be better
explained with reference to Erie principles. Both M & L and Penn Virginia
recognized that the FAA was not intended "to occupy the entire field of
arbitration." 517 Perhaps those courts interpreted this to mean that federal
511. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
512. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (directing its provisions to "the United States court");
supra notes 458-59 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 462-66 and accompanying text.
514. See supra notes 496-98 and accompanying text.
515. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing the goal of the FAA to avoid
the delays and inefficiencies of litigation).
516. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995).
517. M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D.R.I.
1999) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989)); see Penn Va. Oil & Gas Corp. v. CNX Gas Co., No. 1:06cv00090, 2007
WL 593578, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, No.
l:06cv00090, 2007 WL 805891 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2007).
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courts should apply substantive state arbitration laws--of which vacatur
laws are arguably a part5'8-because Erie requires federal diversity courts
to apply substantive state law. 519 This line of reasoning, however, misses
the determinative point: that the conflict in this case is not between a state
law and a rule of federal procedure or decisional law, but between a state
law and a validly enacted federal statute that governs the situation at issue.
In that case, the federal statute unquestionably governs.52 0 There is thus no
justification for applying state vacatur law in federal court where the parties
have not clearly expressed their intent to apply state arbitration law. In state
court, however, the analysis is more complex. The reason for the
complexity is that state courts, unlike federal courts, may legitimately argue
that § 10 does not apply to them and that, therefore, they are free to apply
different state vacatur law, including vacatur law that permits expanded
judicial review.521
B. Preemption in State Court
The starting point for analyzing § 10's preemptive effect in state court is
to analyze its applicability there. 522 And the starting point for that analysis
is to recognize that the law surrounding the FAA's applicability in state
court, especially as it relates to sections other than § 2 and to congressional
intent, is confused. 523 It would be nearly impossible to justify § 10's
applicability in state court based solely on Congress's intent-Congress
almost surely had no intent to do so.524 However, in light of Southland and
its progeny, it would be too simplistic to dismiss § 10's applicability in state
court on those same grounds.525 The better approach would be to examine
the relationship between § 2 and § 10 in light of both Hall Street and the
FAA's underlying policies, and determine whether § 10 is best
characterized as a substantive provision that is applicable in state court, in
the sense that its application there is necessary to achieve § 2's command of
enforcement. 526 This section takes that approach and argues that it is a
substantive provision.
518. See supra notes 418-26 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying
notes 526-32.
519. See supra notes 105, 426 and accompanying text.
520. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that in cases governed by federal
statutes, the federal statute, and not state law, applies); supra note 161 (citing the Supremacy
Clause).
521. See supra notes 381-88, 412-17 and accompanying text (arguing that § 10 does not
apply in state courts).
522. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
523. See supra notes 135, 224 and accompanying text (describing the debate over the
FAA's applicability in state court).
524. See supra notes 39, 135 and accompanying text (presenting arguments that Congress
did not intend the FAA to apply in state court at all).
525. See supra notes 389-403 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress also
intended the FAA to be a unitary statute).
526. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
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The FAA requires that arbitration agreements be enforced according to
their terms. But when a term in an arbitration agreement threatens to upset
the values of arbitration as an institution, the FAA no longer requires its
enforcement. 527 That was the case in Hall Street. The question here is
whether that caveat is important enough to § 2's command of enforcement
to require its application in state courts, where § 2 unquestionably governs.
The answer should be yes. The justification for this result comes largely
from the way that §§ 2 and 10 define the allocation of authority between
courts and arbitrators. At both the front end and the back end of the
arbitration process, the allocation of authority between courts and
arbitrators largely dictates the extent to which the parties comply with the
"arbitration bargain" 528 or, in other words, the extent to which the
arbitration agreement is enforced.529
Section 2 defines the allocation of authority at the front end of the
arbitration process. It determines that when the parties have agreed to
arbitrate, the arbitrators-not the courts-will have the authority to decide
the dispute. In doing so, § 2 is considered substantive and therefore
preempts state laws that attempt to tip this allocation of authority in favor of
the courts. 530  Similarly, § 10-and vacatur laws in general--define the
allocation of authority at the back end of the arbitration process. Sections 9
and 10 provide that when parties have agreed that the arbitration award will
be final and binding, the arbitrators-and not the courts-will have the
authority to make the final award. Laws that provide broad grounds for
review tip the allocation of this authority in favor of the courts. Such laws,
in effect, take the authority to make the final decision out of the arbitrators'
hands and put it into the courts', thus allowing the parties to "escap[e] the
arbitration bargain. ' 531 An appropriately narrow vacatur provision is thus
essential to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Section 10 plays
just that role in upholding § 2's command of enforcement. As such, § 10 is
best characterized as a substantive provision of federal arbitration law.532
527. See supra notes 349-58 and accompanying text (describing how the threat to finality
addressed in Hall Street was a threat to the institution of arbitration itself).
528. Hayford, supra note 233, at 81.
529. See supra notes 419-25 and accompanying text.
530. See supra Part I.D.2.a (addressing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
preemptive effect of § 2).
531. Hayford, supra note 233, at 81.
532. Like § 2, § 10 delineates the boundaries of power between courts and arbitrators.
Because §§ 2 and 10 firmly define where the court's power ends and the arbitrator's power
begins, they are substantive. Other sections of the FAA provide only procedures for giving
effect to that power. For example, § 2 provides that the court's power to decide a dispute
ends where the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to an arbitrator. Sections 3 and 4,
in turn, provide that a court may give effect to that balance of power by staying litigation and
compelling arbitration. Sections 3 and 4 do not affect the allocation of power between the
two adjudicators. Likewise, § 10 provides that a court's power to override an arbitrator's
award ends where none of the statutory (and perhaps also judicially created) grounds are
present. Section 9, in turn, provides a court with a procedure for giving effect to that
allocation of power-that is, by confirming the award and making it into a judgment of the
court. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text (describing particular FAA provisions).
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Therefore, it should apply in state court and preempt state laws that alter the
allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators by limiting parties'
ability to enforce arbitration awards.
The above reasoning sets forth an analysis for determining that § 10, in
fact, applies in state courts. 533 However, to the extent that state courts
answer that question in the negative, they must still contend with the
possibility that a state law ground for judicial review is nonetheless
preempted because it undermines the policies of the FAA. 534 The M & L
court adopted a test for answering that question: does the state law "limit a
party's ability to enforce an arbitration award"? 535 A state law that permits
contractually expanded review almost certainly does. Where the parties
have provided for expanded review, application of a state law permitting
such review would result in vacatur, whereas application of § 10 would
result in confirmation. Thus, the state law would prevent a party from
enforcing an award where the FAA otherwise would require it. 536 In such a
situation, the state law should be preempted.
One could argue, however, that a state law permitting expanded review
does not, as a law in itself, limit the parties' ability to enforce an award; it
merely permits the parties to choose to limit their ability to enforce an
award. 537 Therefore, it hardly undermines the FAA's purpose of ensuring
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. 538 This is a
persuasive point, but it overlooks an important, but subtle, aspect of Hall
Street that undermines its persuasiveness: Hall Street equated review for
legal error by contract with review for legal error generally.539 In doing so,
533. If state courts agree that § 10 applies to them, then the analysis becomes the same as
the analysis in federal court-that is, there would be no justification for applying state
arbitration law unless the parties clearly agreed that state arbitration law would apply. See
supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; supra Part III.A.
534. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
535. M & L Power Servs., Inc. v. Am. Networks Int'l, 44 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141 (D.R.I.
1999).
536. In addition, application of the state law in state court where the parties have not
agreed expressly to apply state arbitration law would mean that parties would get a different
result in state court than they would in federal court. While this situation is normally a
reason for applying the state law in federal court, where, as here, there is a federal statute
that covers the issue in both federal and state court (in the sense that the agreement involves
interstate commerce), application of the federal law in state court is appropriate. Cf supra
note 357 (arguing that if an agreement contains an expanded review provision, losing parties
will nearly always seek vacatur). The other side of this argument is that victorious parties
will nearly always seek confirmation, even if the award is arguably erroneous. Such parties
are likely to seek confirmation by whatever means are available, including removing the case
to federal court to get a different result than they would obtain in state court.
537. See supra notes 427-28 and accompanying text (arguing that a state law provision
permitting expanded review is not a state law ground for review, but the parties' ground for
review).
538. See supra notes 433-45 and accompanying text (arguing that permitting
contractually expanded review does not undermine the policies of the FAA).
539. The key phrase to support this conclusion is the Court's assessment that language in
the Wilko case "expressly rejects just what Hall Street asks for here, general review for an
arbitrator's legal errors." Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404
(2008). Hall Street, however, was not asking for review for legal error generally; it was
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Hall Street suggested that the distinction between the two is essentially
meaningless-both pose the same systemic risk to the finality of arbitration
and both threaten to transform arbitration into little more than a precursor to
litigation. 540  Therefore, if one limits a party's ability to enforce an
arbitration award, so does the other, and both should be preempted. 54' State
laws permitting expanded review by contract thus cannot be justified on the
ground that they pose a lesser (or even nonexistent) threat to the FAA's
underlying policies than state laws that provide for broad review of
arbitration awards in all cases.
The above arguments suggest that contractually expanded review may be
categorically banned from any case in any court involving interstate
commerce. However, that should not be the case. Arbitration is, after all, a
creature of contract,542 and parties that want expanded review should be
able, within limits, to get it. That is precisely the suggestion of the Hall
Street majority in part IV of its opinion. 543 The question remains, however,
how to carve out an exception to Hall Street's holding without eviscerating
the holding's effectiveness. The next section addresses precisely that
question.
C. Obtaining Expanded Review Through Choice ofArbitration
Law Clauses
If § 10 applies in both state and federal court, it will preempt state laws
permitting expanded review in both venues, unless the parties have
expressly agreed that state arbitration law will apply. 544 Thus, parties that
want expanded judicial review must employ some combination of
contractual provisions to obtain it. If such contractual provisions are to be
enforced, they should clearly express the parties' unambiguous intent that
an entire body of state arbitration law will apply to the full exclusion of the
FAA.545 Anything less should result in preemption.
asking for permission to contract for such review if it so chose. See supra notes 312-14 and
accompanying text. The language in Wilko did not reject that. See supra note 320. The
Court's language, however, suggests that it did and, therefore, that the two are functionally
equivalent.
540. See supra notes 355-58 and accompanying text (describing Hall Street's assessment
of the risks contractually expanded review poses to arbitration).
541. A state law that generally permitted review for legal error would undoubtedly limit a
party's ability to enforce an award. See supra note 427 and accompanying text. Therefore, a
law permitting parties to contract for the same standard would do the same.
542. See supra note 488 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 359-68 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
545. The issue of whether state or federal law should determine if the parties intended
state arbitration law to apply should not be problematic here. By explicitly stating that the
entire body of arbitration law will apply to the full exclusion of the FAA, the parties' intent
should be clear under any standard. Moreover, requiring an unambiguous intent to apply
state arbitration law to the exclusion of the FAA as a prerequisite to the enforcement of
contractually expanded review provisions serves to prevent divergent outcomes in state and
federal court. An unambiguous choice of arbitration law clause prevents a diverse party who
is satisfied with an arguably legally erroneous award from removing the confirmation action
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The starting point for analyzing the effectiveness of parties' attempts to
circumvent Hall Street through a choice of arbitration law clause is a proper
reading of Volt. The relevant question arising from Volt is whether, in light
of the parties' clear intent to apply state arbitration law to the exclusion of
the FAA, the FAA nonetheless plays some role beyond a mere
"umbrella. ' 546 In other words, does the FAA in that situation require more
than applying § 2 only as a threshold matter in order both to ensure
enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate according to state law and
to prevent the parties from agreeing to arbitrate according to state laws that,
as a whole, are hostile to arbitration? The FAA should not require more
than that. Where the parties' agreement clearly provides that a body of state
arbitration law should apply and a body of federal law-the FAA-should
not, the parties' agreement should be honored, including provisions for
expanded review, as long as the state law permits them. The content of
individual state law provisions in that situation should be almost
irrelevant. 547 Where the parties have agreed that an entire body of state
arbitration law will apply, an approach that examines the effect of
individual pieces of that body of law on the policies of the FAA serves no
other purpose than to encourage unhappy parties to litigate that very
question-that is, whether a particular provision of the agreed-upon state
arbitration law undermines the policies of the FAA. This seems to be a
question with much greater wiggle room than the question of whether the
body of state law, as a whole, is hostile to arbitration. 548 Moreover,
analysis of individual provisions when the parties have agreed to arbitrate
according to the entire body of state law goes beyond analyzing the validity
of the state laws in light of the parties' agreement. Where the parties have
provided that the entire body of state arbitration law should apply, courts
should analyze the effect on the FAA's policies of the precise thing the
parties have agreed to-that is, the entire body of state law. In this
situation, the question of the effect of individual provisions on the FAA's
policies should be avoided in favor of honoring the parties' agreement. The
from a state court that would vacate the award based on the validity of the expanded review
provision to a federal court that would confirm the award under the FAA (unless some
statutory ground for vacatur or correction were proven) on the ground that the expanded
review provision is invalid under Hall Street. See supra notes 474-75 and accompanying
text (noting that clear choice of arbitration law clauses should be treated the same in federal
court as in state court).
546. See supra Part II.C (analyzing approaches to the role of Volt in situations where
parties have agreed that state arbitration law would apply).
547. To the extent that the approaches taken in Flight Systems and, by analogy, Penn
Virginia suggest that the role of the FAA in cases where Volt applies is to examine the
effects of individual laws on the policies underlying the FAA, rather than the effect of the
body of state arbitration as a whole on those same policies, those approaches should be
disapproved. See supra notes 489-98 and accompanying text.
548. For example, examining the question of whether an expanded review provision
undermines the policies of the FAA can become quite complex, see supra Part II.A.2, while
the question of whether the body of arbitration as a whole is hostile to arbitration may be
analyzed simply by asking if the body of state law reasonably discourages parties from
resorting to arbitration. If it does, it is hostile; if not, it is not.
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effect of an individual provision of agreed-upon state law should only
become an issue when application of that particular law wholly prevents the
parties from arbitrating at all, and where, under the circumstances, it would
be manifestly unreasonable to believe that they had not agreed to do so. 549
Absent such a finding, all provisions of the chosen state's arbitration law-
including those permitting expanded review-should be enforced.
The reasoning set forth above does not eviscerate Hall Street's holding.
It is narrow enough, and places enough potential burdens upon parties, to
make it meaningfully different from the private contractual review
provision struck down in Hall Street. It aims to preserve arbitration's value
of finality as articulated in Hall Street while recognizing party autonomy to
shape the dispute resolution process. Its key point is that, in order to obtain
expanded review, the parties must agree that the entire body of state
arbitration law must apply to the full exclusion of the FAA. A "mix and
match" approach should be preempted. 550 For example, an arbitration
agreement that provides for expanded review and further provides that all
provisions of the FAA will govern except that New Jersey vacatur law will
apply is, in substance, no different from a private contractual review
provision of the type rejected in Hall Street. Simply adorning an otherwise
invalid clause with a reference to state law that otherwise has no bearing on
the agreement is no less a threat to the finality of "arbitration theory"5 51
than the same clause without the state law reference. A contrary conclusion
would render Hall Street's holding meaningless. Thus there must be a
tradeoff. Hall Street imagined the FAA's limited review provisions as a
tradeoff for its expedited treatment of award confirmation proceedings. 552
Similarly, for parties wanting to obtain broader judicial review under state
law, courts should require those parties to be willing to trade off the
benefits of the FAA for the potential peculiarities of the chosen state's
arbitration law. It is a compromise, but it is one that reasonably preserves
Hall Street's message that permitting broad judicial review by contract
threatens to transform arbitration into little more than a precursor to
litigation, thus effectively "bring[ing] arbitration theory to grief in post-
arbitration process. ' 553 However, it also balances Hall Street's holding
with arbitration's virtue of allowing parties to shape the contours of their
549. Casarroto may provide an example of this situation. See supra notes 274-76 and
accompanying text (describing a situation where the Supreme Court suggested that a state
law would have been preempted even if the parties agreed to arbitrate according to that
state's arbitration laws). If the parties in Casarroto had agreed to arbitrate according to
Montana law, application of the Montana notice requirement would have prevented the
parties from arbitrating at all. Further, it would seem unreasonable to believe that the parties
would have read and signed a contract containing an arbitration agreement and yet not
intended to arbitrate unless the agreement also contained a notice of arbitration provision on
the first page of the contract.
550. See supra note 500 (setting out one scholar's argument for a "Mix and Match"
approach).
551. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008).
552. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
553. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405.
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own dispute resolution process. In doing so, the solution this Note proposes
hopes to be logical, reasonable, and consistent both with the values of the
arbitration process and with the existing law surrounding the conflict. A
bright-line rule permitting parties to obtain expanded review under state law
by agreeing that an entire body of state arbitration law will apply to the
exclusion of the FAA obtains just that result.
CONCLUSION
In many instances and for many parties, arbitration is superior to
litigation as a method of dispute resolution. Arbitration's virtues-
flexibility, efficiency, and finality-provide parties with the tools they need
to resolve their disputes in the manner they desire. However, those virtues
also require judicial protection. As this Note discusses, arbitration's virtue
of providing parties with a final decision receives judicial protection in the
form of narrow vacatur provisions, which, according to Hall Street, may not
be expanded by private contract. And as this Note further discusses, Hall
Street's interpretation of the FAA, in most cases, should preempt contrary
state laws. Nonetheless, because of arbitration's contractual nature, parties
who desire such expanded review should be able, within narrowly defined
limits, to get it. This Note offers such a narrowly defined solution to that
problem-that is, to enforce parties' agreements calling for expanded
review when the parties agree to arbitrate according to an entire body of
permissive state law and to the full exclusion of the FAA. Such a solution
preserves both the finality of the arbitration process and the freedom parties
have to shape that process through contractual provisions. In doing so, this
Note hopes to offer a workable solution to an issue bearing practical
consequences for both the judicial and arbitral communities.
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